Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 22 | Issue 2

Article 9

2014

Common Interest Community Convenants and
the Freedom of Contract Myth
Andrea Boyack

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Andrea Boyack, Common Interest Community Convenants and the Freedom of Contract Myth, 22 J. L. & Pol'y (2014).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol22/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX

5/19/2014 11:27 AM

COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITY
COVENANTS AND THE FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT MYTH
Andrea J. Boyack*
INTRODUCTION
A generation ago, only 1% of the United States population
lived in a privately governed common-interest community
(“CIC”).1 Today, approximately 64 million people (20% of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. J.D.
(University of Virginia), M.A.L.D. (Tufts University), B.A. (Brigham Young
University). I would like to thank Nestor Davidson, Wilson Freyermuth, Alex
Glashausser, Michael Lewyn, David Rubenstein, and Dale Whitman for their
comments. I am grateful for the hard work of my research assistants, Taylor
Kramer and Cecilia Nuby, and for the patience and support of my wonderful
family.
1
“Common interest community” is defined by the Restatement (Third) of
Property to be a “development or neighborhood in which individually owned
lots or units are burdened by a servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot
be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal (1) to pay for the use of, or contribute to
the maintenance of, property held or enjoyed in common by the individual
owners, or (2) to pay dues or assessments to an association that provides
services or facilities to the common property or to the individually owned
property, or that enforces other servitudes burdening the property in the
development or the neighborhood.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 1.8 (2000). Sometimes the term common interest development
or CID is used to refer to the same thing. CICs include condominiums and
homeowner associations, also known as PUDs (planned unit developments).
While structured differently, cooperative ownership developments are often
included within the rubric of CIC. The Community Associations Institute
(CAI) is a trade association representing all CICs nationwide. According to
CAI, approximately 2 million out of a population of 203 million people (0.9%)
in 1970 resided in a CIC. Industry Data, CMTY. ASS’NS INST.,
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country’s population) reside in one of the more than 300,000
CICs in the United States.2 Residents in CICs are bound to a
private governance scheme that includes written obligations that
have been recorded in the local land records and run with the
land as well as rules and regulations enacted from time to time by
the board of directors of the community association.3 These
covenants and rules form the private law of the community, and
generally courts will grant injunctions or specific performance to
enforce such regulations. State law also permits a CIC association
to assess lien-backed fines for non-compliance.4 Buyers of homes
in a CIC are deemed to have voluntarily elected to be legally
bound to all the private community rules, to have such rules
http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb.
12, 2014).
2
CAI tracks data regarding the number of CICs and their residents.
CMTY. ASS’NS INST., INDUSTRY DATA, http://www.caionline.org/info/
research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). CAI’s data indicates
that the number of residents of common interest communities has increased to
63.4 million today. This figure represents 20.2% of the population of the
U.S.A., estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2012 to be approximately
313.9 million. U.S. & World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). The percentage
of the population residing in a CIC continues to grow. WAYNE S. HYATT &
SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 3 (2d ed. 2008); Andrea J. Boyack,
Community Collateral Damage: A Question of Priorities, 43 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 53, 58 (2011) [hereinafter Boyack, Community Collateral Damage]. The
proliferation of the CIC form is not uniformly heralded as a positive
development. See David E. Grassmick, Minding the Neighbor’s Business: Just

How Far Can Condominium Owners’ Associations Go in Deciding Who Can
Move into the Building?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 189 (asserting that in a

sort of “Gresham’s Law” (bad money drives out good) a “condominium or
owners’ association-governed community is crowding out other types of
housing from the market”).
3
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 6.4, 6.7, 6.16 (2000);
see also HYATT & FRENCH supra note 2, at 95–104 (discussing the power of an
association to enact rules governing the community).
4
See WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 105, 121 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing
assessments and other collection devices).

2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX

5/19/2014 11:27 AM

COMMUNITY COVENANT CONTRACT MYTH

769

specifically enforced, and to subject their property to a security
interest securing their obligations to the community.
For the most part, courts do not undertake a substantive
analysis of the desirability of individual community covenants.5
Courts reason that all members of a community have agreed to be
contractually bound to this private governance scheme, 6 and
therefore judicial deference to community choices is mandated by
freedom of contract policies.7 The proper judicial role, under this
conception of the CIC, is to ensure that any changes to the private
legislative content (covenant amendments or rule enactments)
occur according to the privately enumerated process.8 Focusing
For example, the court in Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373, 376
(Ariz. 2006), enjoined a homeowner from keeping a recreational vehicle on his
property by holding that CIC covenants should be enforceable according to the
intent of the drafting party, specifically departing from and rejecting the rule
of strict construction of covenants that run with the land. See also Jeffrey A.
Goldberg, Note, Community Association Use Restrictions: Applying the
Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 673; (1998); Robert
G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and “Reasonableness” in Private Law: The
Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 45–47
(1990).
6
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (asserting that CIC restrictions “are clothed with a very
strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each individual
unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be
imposed”); see also, e.g., Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’
Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 74 (Colo. App. 1993); Joslin v.
Pine River Dev. Corp., 367 A.2d 599, 601 (N.H. 1976).
7
Courts reason that while a community’s group preferences may not
coincide with individual owner preferences, those owners have agreed to
subordinate their individual wishes to the choices of a group. This concept,
that the interrelationship among owners in a CIC justifies some curtailment of
individual rights, is a fundamentally accepted aspect of CIC covenant
enforcement. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181–
82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (“[T]o promote the health, happiness, and peace
of mind of the majority of the unit owners since they are living in such close
proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner must give up a
certain degree of freedom of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in
separate, privately owned property.”).
8
If regulations and amendments apply equally to all members and are
5
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solely on how covenants are amended and how rules are enacted
does ensure that community members enjoy some level of
procedural due process with respect to changes to CIC governing
provisions. However, there is little actual substantive limit on the
covenants and regulations that CICs can impose, either through
amendment or as part of the original recorded covenants and
community rules.
Courts unrealistically presume that purchasing property within
a CIC is in itself an adequate manifestation of assent to be bound
to CIC governing provisions. General deference to parties’
substantive choices in contracting is proper. But freedom of
contract is an inadequate justification for covenant enforcement in
the context of privately governed communities. Such covenants
do not necessarily represent voluntary owner assent to obligation
and do not necessarily reflect neighborhood preferences. The
covenants are perpetual, non-negotiable contracts of adhesion,
bundled with one of the most personal, expensive, and
complicated purchases an individual will ever make—the
purchase of a home.9 As servitudes, CIC covenants enjoy
duration and specific enforceability that go beyond typical
contract rights.10 In addition, the terms of a community’s laws are
not self-imposed; instead, they are crafted by developers and
driven by the requirements of lenders and governments.11 The
only escape from a given CIC governance scheme is sale of one’s
promulgated according to the procedures set forth in the governing documents,
courts will generally uphold them. HYATT, supra note 4, at 56, 173. See, e.g.,
Kroop v. Caravelle Condo, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding that amendments severely limiting an owner’s right to lease his unit
were valid because the amendment was passed according to the procedure set
forth in the CIC declaration).
9
See infra Part II.A.
10
See infra Part II.B; see also Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom
of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions , 70 IOWA L. REV.
615, 617 (1985) (explaining the “difficult questions of intergenerational
fairness” that arise in the context of CIC restraints).
11
See infra Part II.D. The content of CIC covenants is motivated in part
by mortgage market constraints imposed by federal agencies or Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.
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home,12 and in some markets even this will be ineffective due to
lack of real choice among residential neighborhood options.13
Contract analogy should not create presumptive validity for
all CIC covenants and properly enacted rules. The reality of CIC
governance is more complicated and implicates property and
constitutional concerns as well as contract law. The proper
approach to CIC governance review must draw from all three of
these areas of the law. The subject matter scope of CIC
governance should be limited based on servitude law principles.
Constitutional protections should be legislated for members of
CICs. And bona fide, deliberate assent should be prerequisite to
holding owners bound to CIC obligations.
Part I of this Article explores the origins and judicial
treatment of the private laws of self-governed communities. CIC
covenants are legal hybrids—enforced as contracts but specifically
enforceable against successive landowners because they are
servitudes. Part II explains how CIC covenants and rules diverge
from the typical contractual model. CIC covenants are contracts
of adhesion, made up of completely non-negotiable, recorded
terms bundled into home acquisition. Developers and lenders
generally prescribe the content of such covenants, and they may
not reflect community desires or values. Part III explains how a
refocused freedom of contract rationale, an updated variant of
traditional servitude requirements, and new legislation regarding
important personal freedoms can bring clarity and fairness to
common interest community law.
I. THE CURIOUS CASE OF COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES

A. Legal Hybrids: Contracts Enforced as Servitudes and
Functioning as Constitutions
CICs are creatures both of property law and of contracts. In
terms of function, they are akin to “mini governments.”14 The
12
13
14

See infra Part II.C.
See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the
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foundational structure of CICs, however, is servitude law.15 In a
CIC, all property owners are bound together under a system of
real covenants and share certain financial obligations and property
rights.16 Every property owner within a CIC is also a mandatory
member of a contractually defined association that provides
private governance for the community.17 The power of an
association to govern, to assess owners for upkeep, and to
enforce rules regarding use and appearance of individual
properties is established through a recorded declaration of
covenants (sometimes called CC&Rs). These covenants bind all
successive owners of the property by virtue of their ownership, a
concept called “running with the land.” Although framed much
like a multilateral contract, CIC covenants transcend typical
contractual obligation and become obligations of the property
itself, binding its successive owners and specifically enforceable
Development and Administration of Condominium and Home Owners
Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 918 (1976) (explaining that a
CIC association is a “quasi government entity, paralleling in almost every case
the powers, duties, and responsibilities of a municipal government”); see also
David L. Callies & Adrienne I. Suarez, Privatization and the Providing of
Public Facilities Through Private Means, 21 J.L. & POL. 477, 499 (2005)
(explaining how courts have used the “mini-government theory” to justify
implying assessment powers where governing documents failed to explicitly so
provide).
15
A servitude is a legal device that creates a right or obligation that runs
with the land. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1(1). A
servitude can be an easement, profit, or covenant. Id. § 1.1(2). The
Restatement calls covenants that are servitudes “covenants running with the
land.” Id. § 1.3. Modern courts do not distinguish between equitable and real
covenants. Lake Limerick Country Club v. Hunt Mfg. Homes, Inc., 84 P.3d
295, 298–99 (Wash. App. 2004). In this article, I use both “covenant” and
“real covenant” to refer to covenants running with the land.
16
See Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 60 (“All
types of CICs . . . share the same essential service and payment structure:
homeowner-elected directors manage common upkeep, and all homeowners
contribute their pro rata portion of the common costs.”); see also HYATT &
FRENCH, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing the power of an elected board of
directors); HYATT, supra note 4, at 84–88, 105, 121 (discussing powers of a
board, community assessments, and collection devices).
17
HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 2, at 6, 13–14.
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in perpetuity.18 The covenant obligations in CICs are not static
because the association can amend the CC&Rs or pass rules to
further clarify or carry out the purposes of the community.19
In addition to recorded covenants contained in a community’s
CC&Rs, the board of the community association can pass specific
regulations authorized by the recorded declaration. These
regulations can be changed as the board sees fit. CIC obligations
can therefore arise either from the terms of the original recorded
declaration, from amendments to the declaration, or from the
rules promulgated by the board of directors to carry out the
general purposes of the association.20 Courts generally are more
deferential to recorded covenants than to rules enacted by the
board, reasoning that owners had more notice of recorded
covenants and that such covenants are not as easily changed.21 In
addition, state statutes sometimes limit the ability of a board to
promulgate rules governing individually owned property (as
opposed to common elements) and individuals’ behavior.22
18

Any associated financial obligations are secured by a lien on the subject
property. HYATT, supra note 4, at 120–21.
19
CIC purposes are almost always defined as preserving and promoting
property values and owner “lifestyle.” Apple II Condo. Ass’n v. Worth Bank
& Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93, 95–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); see also Ngai
Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to Promote
Neighborhood Stability, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 43–46 (2009);
Zachary M. Rawling, Reevaluating Leasing Restrictions in Community
Associations: Rejecting Reasonableness in Favor of Consent , 5 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 223, 224–25 (2009).
20
HYATT, supra note 4, at 82–88 (discussing the powers of a board of
directors of a CIC association); see also Todd Brower, Communities Within

the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other Failures of Legal
Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 242

(1992) (noting that CIC enforcement is justified based on the unanimous assent
of its members to covenant terms and explaining that later amendments “pose
special problems”).
21
Id. at 50–51; Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Assn., 878 P.2d
1275, 1283 (Cal. 1994).
22
UNIFORM COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-102 (1994)
[hereinafter UCIOA]; HYATT, supra note 4, at 52; see also Buddin v. Golden
Bay Manor, Inc., 585 So. 2d 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (declaring a
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Occasionally, public policy provides a substantive outer limit
on restrictive covenants. For example, in a handful of cases, a
non-compete covenant or a restriction on alienation has been
declared unenforceable as contravening public policy.23 Aside
from such outlier cases, however, courts today will generally
enforce covenant obligations that have something to do with the
property as long as the obligations have been created by an
intentional, recorded writing.24 This is different than in the past.
Traditionally, in order for landowners to create a real covenant,
the covenant must be in writing, specifically intended to run with
the land, touch and concern the real property, be adequately
publicized (usually by recordation in the applicable local land
records in order to create third party notice), and be authored by
parties who were linked in “horizontal privity.”25 Modernly,
courts have moved away from strictly requiring these elements
exist in order for a covenant to have been created. The newer
approach relies on an intentional, recorded writing alone,
focusing on upholding as a servitude any provision specifically
intended to be a servitude. This approach dispenses with the
board rulemaking ultra vires).
23
See, e.g., Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288
(N.J. 1990) (striking down a covenant not to compete for a grocery store
property); Riste v. E. Washington Bible Camp, Inc., 605 P.2d 1294 (Wash.
App. 1980) (striking down a restriction on conveying property without church
approval).
24
E.g., Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (Ariz. 2006); Vulcan
Materials Co. v. Miller, 691 So. 2d 908, 913 (Miss. 1997); Runyon v. Paley,
416 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1992). The requirement that a covenant “touch and
concern” the land requires that the substance of the covenant relate to the real
property itself. By requiring that a covenant touch and concern the land in
order to run with the land, the common law sought to ensure that personal
obligations unrelated to the ownership of the property would only bind the
original parties—in contract—and would not be deemed servitudes that would
continue as specifically enforceable obligations for all landowners.
25
RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 537 cmt. h (1944) (justifying the touch and
concern requirement as a means to reduce the number of permissible real
covenants). “Horizontal privity” requires both parties to simultaneously hold
an interest in the same property, such as a landlord and tenant or buyer and
seller. Neighbors, for example, would not be in horizontal privity.
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formalistic requirement of privity and, to some extent, the touch
and concern test.26
Most of the requirements for covenant creation deal with
required formalities, but the touch and concern requirement—to
the extent it still exists—has to do with substance and limits the
scope of perpetually restraining covenants.27 For example,
traditionally, a promise to pay money could not be a covenant
obligation as it was considered not to touch and concern the land.
But courts eventually accepted that the assessment of property to
pay for joint amenities was a proper subject matter for real
covenants,28 and it was this expansion of the notion of touch and
concern that spurred growth of suburban planned communities
across the country.29 In the past several decades, the touch and
26

Courts adopting the new Restatement of Property approach no longer
closely examine concepts of privity and touch and concern in order to deny
servitude enforcement. E.g., Oliver v. Schultz, 885 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Ky.
1994); Matter of Parcel of Land Located on Geneva Lake, Town of Linn,
Walworth Cnty., 477 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.1, 3.1, and 3.7 (2000). Some scholars
likewise argue that the touch and concern test is unnecessary. See Richard A.
Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes , 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1353, 1359–60 (1982) [hereinafter Epstein, Notice and Freedom of
Contract]. The approach of the Restatement (Third) is still controversial and
several jurisdictions have refused to embrace its approach. E.g., Nickerson v.
Green Valley Recreation, Inc., 265 P.3d 1108, 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011);
Regency Homes Ass’n v. Egermayer, 498 N.W.2d 783, 791 (Neb. 1993). For
an example of the rare case of a court finding that a covenant does not touch
and concern the land and therefore does not run with the land, see Ebbe v.
Senior Estates Golf & Country Club, 657 P.2d 696 (Or. App. 1983). See also
supra note 24.
27
Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy
Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 433, 449 (1984) [hereinafter Korngold, Privately Held Conservation
Servitudes]. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 537 cmt. h (1944) (justifying
the requirement as a means to reduce the number of permissible real
covenants).
28
See, e.g., Regency Homes Ass’n v. Egermayer, 498 N.W.2d 783
(Neb. 1993); Neponsit Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Emigrant
Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N.Y. 248 (1930).
29
EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
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concern requirement has faded in importance. The new
Restatement calls it unnecessary. But without the touch and
concern requirement, covenants have no substantive limits
beyond the public policy restraints placed on all contracts.
The legality of CIC governance crystallized during the last
century.30 But the outer boundary of permissible subject matter
for CIC regulation remains the subject of heated debate.31 As
courts over the past century began to take a more permissive view
toward CICs and associated covenant requirements, developers
increasingly structured communities with common amenities and
assessment obligation servitudes, confident that courts would
uphold the governance scheme. In the twentieth century,
community real estate development became a big part of the real
estate industry. Developers pioneered using servitude law to
achieve their visions of community planning and design. At first,
developers relied on restrictive covenants to limit land uses as a
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 31–32 (1996).
30
Although the modern CIC did not appear until the 1970s, the
underlying legal forms that make CICs possible can be traced back to the
sixteenth century’s breakdown of the English common field system. The
Industrial Revolution heralded changes in land use that increased potential
negative externalities on neighbors. Property law expanded the law of
servitudes as an adaptation to these new developments. Id.; see also JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 668–70 (5th ed. 2002). Initially
courts were worried that this ownership structure would negatively impact
alienability. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Ulrich, 34 N.E. 556 (Ill. 1893) (holding
that since limitations on free alienability are disfavored at law, ambiguities are
to be resolved against the restrictive covenants); Carol M. Rose, Property Law
and the Rise, Life, and Demise of Racially Restrictive Covenants (Ariz. Legal
Studies Discussion Paper No.13-21, 2013), reprinted in POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY (Michael Allan Wolf & Richard R. Powell, eds., 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243028. Initially, courts were concerned that
enforcing this new brand of servitude would adversely affect alienability of
land. MCKENZIE, supra note 29, at 32.
31
See, e.g., Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An
Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 293–94 (1976) (advocating a
robust “touch and concern” test as a way of limiting the scope of permissible
CIC regulations); Brower, supra note 20, at 272–73 (advancing a theory that
presumptive enforceability of CIC covenants should turn on the extent of the
particular liberty right curtailed).
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way to preserve values, particularly for affluent suburban
communities.32 Many early generation covenant communities
were created by obtaining the unanimous consent of all
neighborhood residents, and these covenants focused on
restricting undesirable uses33 and users.34
In the 1960s and the 1970s, there was a further revolution in
CIC ownership form through the increased use of condominiums.
During this time, new developments increasingly were structured
as privately governed communities prior to sale of the first unit,
and in these communities owner assent was presumed through
purchase of property already burdened with CC&Rs. Although
the cooperative form had previously been used to approximate
real property ownership of a unit in a multi-family building,35 in
the 1960s, actual fee simple property ownership of apartment
units was made possible by the enactment of condominium32
33

Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d at 793.

Community covenants are very useful in addressing negative external
impacts that the use of one parcel imposes upon other proximate parcels, and
are preferable to reliance on nuisance law to protect property from such
negative externalities. See Andrea J. Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation
Restraints and the Hazard of Unbounded Servitudes, 42 REAL ESTATE L.J. 450
(2013) [hereinafter Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation Restraints].
34
“Occupancy restrictions perhaps were the raison d’être of earlygeneration covenant-based communities.” Id.; see also Grassmick, supra note
2; LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND
PROPERTY LINES 123 (2009). For a thorough discussion and analysis of
historic racial occupancy restrictions in CICs, see RICHARD R.W. BROOKS &
CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013).
35
The cooperative ownership structure allowed shareholders of an owning
entity to obtain exclusive, perpetual possessory rights with respect to a single
apartment unit. Cooperatives are generally included in the definition of CICs
even though their ownership form is based on lease and corporate law.
Cooperatives, often known as co-ops, are more commonly found in earlier
urbanized areas, such as New York City. Susan Stellin, Co-op vs. Condo: The
Differences Are Narrowing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012, at RE9. Cooperative
buildings do not permit fee simple ownership of a given unit, instead, the
entire building is owned by an entity, and each “owner” holds a share of
membership interest in the entity. The shareholders have, as an appurtenance
to their ownership interests, a perpetual lease on “their” unit.
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enabling statutes.36 By the 1970s, every state had adopted a
statute specifically permitting condominium ownership.37 In 1977,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws began drafting the Uniform Condominium Act based on the
1974 Virginia model. Subsequently, the Conference prepared
uniform laws governing the three forms of CICs (condominiums,
cooperatives, and homeowners associations) and combined the
resulting three acts into the Uniform Common Interest Ownership
Act (UCIOA).38 To date, eight states have adopted the UCIOA.39
36

The Condominium is a creature of statute that permits fee simple
ownership defined along three-dimensional planes, rather than common law
two-dimensionally defined land ownership boundaries. In the common law, the
third dimension is ad coelom: a column of space “from the center of the earth
to the heavens.” See William Schwartz, Condominium: A Hybrid Castle in the
Sky, 44 B.U. L. REV. 137, 141 (1964) (noting the traditional view that
“whatever is attached to the land belongs to the land” and, consequently, to the
person who owns the land itself); Charles W. Pittman, Note, Land Without
Earth—The Condominium, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 203, 205–06 (1962) (noting
the general hostility expressed in European civil codes to the concept of
horizontal property). Condominium ownership is the only way to own an
apartment in fee simple. The earliest state condominium statutes tracked the
FHA Model Act and in some key aspects were insufficient, ambiguous and
ineffective. See Robert Kratovil, The Declaration of Restrictions, Easements,
Liens, and Covenants: An Overview of an Important Document , 22 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 69 (1988). Once condominium-enabling statutes were
passed in the early 1970s, condominium ownership of apartments rapidly
replaced the cooperative form as the most common way to obtain “ownership”
of an apartment unit. The condominium ownership structure made ownership
of urban apartment dwelling units possible and has proved so flexible that
today fee simple ownership can exist with respect to “postage stamp” buildings
(the outlines of the building alone without any surrounding land), parking
spaces, interior store spaces, and even air space for telecommunications
equipment.
37
Every state adopted a condominium statute in the 1960s, and this paved
the way for a huge condominium “boom” during the next few decades.
HYATT, supra note 4, at 11.
38
UCIOA, supra note 22. The UCIOA was created by combining the
Uniform Condominium Act, the Uniform Planned Community Act, and the
Model Real Estate Cooperative Act.
39
Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 100.
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Other states have retained their early condominium statutes or
have made updates thereto but have not adopted the uniform
statute.40
Three similar but legally distinct ownership structures fall
under the CIC rubric. In planned unit development, individual
owners hold title to lots and are members of an association that
owns common property. The condominium association, in
contrast, does not own any property. In condominiums, owners
hold fee simple title to their unit and are tenants in common with
all other unit owners with respect to common property. All
property in a cooperative is owned by an association, and all
“owners” are shareholders of that association as well as tenants
under a perpetual lease with respect to their unit. Although the
legal structure of ownership among the three forms of CICs
differs,41 all CICs allow buyers to obtain amenities that they could
not otherwise afford individually, and owners of any property
within a community are automatically members of the CIC—there
is no opt out.
The possibility for shared private contribution to the costs of
community amenities and upkeep through CIC ownership
structures proved popular with local governments. Municipalities
quickly perceived the benefit of creating taxable housing that
provided its own community maintenance framework (including

40
41

Id.

In condominium ownership, every member owns her unit in fee simple
and all members collectively hold the remainder of the condominium (the roof,
lobby, elevators, amenities, parking garage, electrical system, etc.) as tenants
in common. PUD development is similar to condominiums, but typically the
lot owners do not own common areas as tenants in common; instead, the
association owns the common areas. In all three forms of CICs, property
ownership is synonymous with membership in the governing association, and
in all three ownership forms, members must abide by recorded covenants and
rules established by the association’s board. The association is responsible for
maintenance of the CIC and is funded in full by assessments levied on the
members. The obligation to pay assessments is secured by a lien on the real
property owned by the member. See generally HYATT & FRENCH, supra note
2; Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2.
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snow removal, paving, and in some cases even fire and safety). 42
Because of this ability to privatize public function, local
governments have actively encouraged the spread of CIC form as
a way to privately finance community services.43 Municipalities
have even required new residential developments to be structured
as CICs in order to generate revenue rather than as non-CICs
which demand more municipally funded infrastructure and
upkeep.44 The governmental budgetary motive for encouraging
private CIC structuring reflects demands for lower property
taxes.45 On the other hand, as municipalities push for CIC
structuring, buyers who specifically would like to live outside a
CIC may be unable to find non-CIC housing. In addition, owners
in CICs effectively are taxed twice—once through municipal

See CLIFFORD TREESE ET AL., RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM.,
CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION MORTGAGE
UNDERWRITING AND CREDIT ANALYSIS 6 (2001), available at http://www.
housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publications/48502_ChangingPerspectiveson
CommunityAssociationMortgageUnderwriting.pdf (stating that government
privatizes its functions, requiring community associations to fulfill an
otherwise municipal obligation); see also HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 2, at
13–14 (explaining how CICs function like local governments); Boyack,
Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 121 (comparing the function
of associations to that of local governments and comparing association
assessments to property taxes).
43
Susan F. French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The
Next Step, 37 URB. LAW. 359 (2005).
44
TREESE ET AL., supra note 42, at 3 (discussing methods that
communities utilize to minimize taxes); Boyack, Community Collateral
Damage, supra note 2, at 60 (“The CIC structure enables more community
amenities and upkeep, permitting neighborhoods to self-fund and allowing
local governments to avoid raising taxes in response to more housing
developments.”).
45
In California, Proposition 13 limited municipal ability to increase
property taxes to meet demand for community services, and CIC governance
was a way to provide community amenities without draining tax revenue. The
trend away from property tax funded amenities is self-perpetuating because
residents in CICs, who have to pay community assessments in addition to
property taxes, are strong and local voting blocks against property tax
increases. Callies & Suarez, supra note 14, at 493.
42
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property taxes and once through CIC assessments.46
On balance, the innovation of the CIC is a positive
development. CIC structures have led to increased home
ownership in the United States. CICs also address the problem of
neighborhood nuisances47 and increase available neighborhood
amenities.48 Still, CIC jurisprudence shows troubling claims of
overreaching by association governments and the enforcement of
abusive covenants.49 Some scholars bemoan the erosion of
46

In one state, New Jersey, taxpayers have successfully claimed the right
to offset a portion of their community assessments from property taxes,
claiming that they were penalized by double taxation without this offset.
HYATT, supra note 4, at 133 (citing Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Estate of
Allison, 174 A.2d 631, 640 (N.J. Super Ct. 1961) (reasoning that a property’s
true value does not include the value of rights transferred to a community)).
Other than in New Jersey, however, assessments are not deductible from tax
impositions. Id. at 106.
47
In situations where neighbors do not have community covenants, or
where covenants do not explicitly prohibit an objectionable activity, neighbors
can claim that the objectionable activity should be proscribed as a nuisance.
Relying on the tort of nuisance to prohibit uses of neighboring property,
however, is unpredictable, inconsistent, and often ineffective. For example, In
Turudic v. Stephens, an Oregon court found that keeping two “pet” cougars in
a residential neighborhood did not constitute a nuisance. 31 P.3d 465 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001). On the other hand, courts routinely limit uses of property based
on restrictions in a community’s CC&Rs without requiring that the use be
proven to be a nuisance. See, e.g., Laumbauch v. Westgate, C.A. No. 2442VCS, 2008 WL 3846419 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008), aff'd, 966 A.2d 349 (Del.
2009).
48
See Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation Restraints, supra note
33; Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829;
French, supra note 43.
49
See, e.g., Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99
HARV. L. REV. 472, 473 (1985) (explaining the potential for CICs to become
“illiberal communities,” namely “communities that repudiate norms embodied
in traditional civil rights”); Kristina Caffrey, The House of the Rising Sun:

Homeowners' Associations, Restrictive Covenants, Solar Panels, and the
Contract Clause, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 721, 738 (2010) (explaining how

“faction abuse and tyranny of the majority” prevents CICs from adequately
resolving issues regarding solar panels); Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Community
Association Use Restrictions: Applying the Business Judgment Doctrine , 64
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 670 (1988) (explaining that CIC boards have
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personal freedom, property rights, and neighborhood diversity
that has resulted from the proliferation of the CIC ownership
model.50

B. Judicial Oversight of CIC Governance
The CIC phenomenon is impacted by an array of legal
disciplines, including association governance, constitutional
rights, and property law. But more and more, courts have
conceived of CIC governing provisions under the rubric of
contract jurisprudence. The rhetoric of freedom of contract is
often used as the primary justification for upholding CIC
regulations and restrictions.51 The reality of how parties become
obligated to CIC covenants and board-enacted rules, however,
calls into question just how appropriate and far-reaching freedom
of contract rationale is in the CIC context.
Courts have struggled with the best way to characterize CIC
covenants and rules, but for all courts, the analysis of CIC
enormous power and thus enormous potential for abuse of that power); Robert
C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1531 (1982) (explaining how wealth redistribution and other economic abuses
of power can impose “victimization costs” on dissenting owners in a CIC);
Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 275 (1976) (explaining how personal biases may lead to
governing power abuse in CICs). Even in upholding CIC governing acts, the
Nahrstedt court cautioned that “[b]ecause of its considerable power in
managing and regulating a common interest development, the governing board
of an owners association must guard against the potential for the abuse of that
power. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Assn., 878 P.2d 1275, 1281–82
(Cal. 1994). Professor Stewart Sterk suggests, however, that the democratic
basis of association governance provides a built-in protection against abuse of
power by a CIC board. Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential
Private Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273, 341 (1997).
50
E.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 29; Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel,

Trust and Community: The Common Interest Community as Metaphor and
Paradox, 72 MO. L. REV. 1111 (2007).
51
E.g., Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1286; Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso,
393 So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Apple II Condo. Ass’n v.
Worth Bank & Trust, 659 N.E. 2d at 93, 96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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regulation validity starts with the foundational assumption that
owners voluntarily obligate themselves to CIC governance when
they buy into the community. Based on this presumption, courts
explain that owners voluntarily agreed to relinquish “a certain
degree of freedom of choice” when they became members of the
CIC.52 Therefore, the covenants and properly enacted rules are
presumptively binding as contract terms. In particular, provisions
of the recorded declaration as of the date of an owner’s purchase
are presumptively binding unless the provisions violate public
policy.53
Theoretically, a court may strike down CIC covenants based
on finding that they infringe upon members’ “constitutional
rights.”54 But constitutional violations must involve state action,
and this is a difficult hurdle to overcome in the context of CIC
associations.55 Sometimes disgruntled owners claim that an
association’s power is restrained by state or federal constitutions
based on an expansive conception of state action. For example,
one theory—made in reference to the 1944 Supreme Court case of
HYATT, supra note 4, at 50–51 (explaining how widely cited this
foundational assumption is); see also Basso, 393 So. 2d at 637.
53
Public policy limits the substance of covenants in the same way that
pubic policy limits the substance of contracts. For example, some covenants
not to compete have been held unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
Davidson Bros., Inc. v. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288 (N.J. 1990).
Theoretically, public policy should also restrain covenants that unduly limit
alienation of real property. See, e.g., Riste v. E. Wash. Bible Camp, Inc., 605
P.2d 1294 (Wash Ct. App. 1980).
54
See HYATT, supra note 4, at 62–63. The standard for review is whether
any category one restriction is wholly arbitrary, in violation of public policy or
an individual’s constitutional rights. Pines of Boca Barwood Condo. Ass’n v.
Cavouti, 605 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
55
There must be “state action” to enforce constitutional rights. Comm.
For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d
1060, 1067 (N.J. 2007); see also HYATT, supra note 4, at 62–63. For
example, one court specifically explained that a covenant limiting occupancy
that would violate constitutional rights if created by the local government
through a zoning ordinance did not create a constitutional problem because it
was privately enacted. See White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d
346, 349 (Fla. 1979).
52
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Shelley v. Kraemer—is that even if acts by an association are not

themselves state action, state action exists when a court enforces
such governance acts, and it is this judicial state action that
renders the covenant’s substance vulnerable to constitutional
scrutiny.56 Most courts, however, decline to apply Shelley outside
the private racial zoning context.57 Another theory, made in
reference to the 1946 Supreme Court case of Marsh v. Alabama,
posits that CICs are the functional equivalent of local
governments and should therefore be bound to the same
constitutional constraints.58 However, this theory has not gained
widespread support, perhaps because today’s CICs do not
completely replace local public governments in the same way that
a company town did in the time of Marsh.59 Both of these theories
have generally been rejected by courts.60 Today, aside from Fair
Housing Act prohibitions of sale transfer restrictions that are
56

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1944); Midlake on Big Boulder
Lake Condo. Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(holding that the owners “contractually agreed to abide by the provisions in the
Declaration at the time of purchase, thereby relinquishing their freedom of
speech concerns regarding placing signs on the property”); but see Goldberg
v. 400 E. Ohio, Condo., 12 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
57
See Katherine Rosenberry, An Introduction to Constitutional Challenges
to Covenant Enforcement, 1 J. COMM. ASS’N 23 (1998).
58
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
59
HYATT, supra note 4, at 64–65; see also, e.g., Goldberg v. 400 E.
Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“Demonstrating that
condominiums do certain things that state governments also do doesn’t show
that condominiums are acting as the state or in the state’s place.”). The
holding in Marsh has been applied to cases having to do with public
accommodation and access. Id.; see also Amalgamated Food Emp. Union,
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), abrogated by
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). For an interesting discussion
regarding the extent to which CICs function as municipal governments with
respect to non-members, see David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as
State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers ,
105 YALE L.J. 761(1995).
60
HYATT, supra note 4, at 67. See, e.g., Pines of Boca Barwood Condo.
Ass’n v. Cavouti, 605 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); White
Egret, 379 So.3d at 349.
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based on a constitutionally protected classification (race, religion,
etc.),61 and the odd outlier decision,62 the U.S. Constitution
apparently does not provide any substantive oversight of common
interest community covenants.
A few courts have been willing to invalidate CIC governing
acts on the basis of state constitutional violations.63 Cases where
state constitutional guaranties have been applied to CIC
governance mostly deal with freedom of speech and rights of
access.64 But other constitutional challenges abound. For
example, recent cases dealing with both state and federal
constitutional claims have raised the issue of whether freedom of
religion guaranties can prohibit CIC regulation of placement of a
mezuzah on a doorframe65 or painting a kolam on a driveway.66
61

Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2012). The Act, as
amended, prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of
dwellings, and in other housing-related transactions, based on race, color,
national origin, religion, sex, familial status (including children under the age
of 18 living with parents or legal custodians, pregnant women, and people
securing custody of children under the age of 18), and disability. Id. § 3604.
62
For example, in Gerber v. Longboat Condominium, a veteran’s right to
fly the American flag in violation of CIC covenants was upheld by the court
striking down the covenant prohibition as a violation of the Constitution. 724
F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989), aff’d in part on reh’g, Gerber g. Longboat
Condominum, 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1991). A different court
criticized the Gerber decision as being based on emotion, not on law. Goldberg
v. 400 East Ohio Condo., 12 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
63
E.g., Comm. For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’
Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1072 (N.J. 2007) (explaining that New Jersey
constitutional application does not necessarily require a public actor); see also
HYATT, supra note 4, 67–73; Frank Askin, Free Speech, Private Space, and
the Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 947, 960–61 (1998).
64
E.g., Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills,
182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Guttenberg Taxpayers &
Rentpayer’s Ass’n v. Galaxy Towers Condo. Ass’n, 688 A.2d 156, 158–59
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996); Midlake on Big Boulder Lake Condo. Ass’n
v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). See also Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 47447 U.S. 74 (1980) (explaining that a state’s
constitution may protect individuals from private actors even when the U.S.
Constitution would not).
65
A mezuzah is a small container holding handwritten parchment with a
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State action problems also plague state constitutional claims in the
CIC context, and the law in this area is muddled and
inconsistent.67
Unless proven to be “arbitrary, against public policy or
scriptoral passage that is affixed to the entranceway to a home by devout Jews.
The Seventh Circuit in Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009),
held that a CIC rule prohibiting “objects of any sort” outside a resident’s door
was neutral as to religion and therefore reasonable and enforceable. It is
common for CICs to restrict changes to the exterior of homes without
association permission. See Angela C. Carmella, Religion-Free Environments
in Common Interest Communities, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 57, 68 (2010) (discussing
“aesthetic controls on signs, symbols, decorations, statuary, or items of any
kind”).
66
A kolam is a Hindu religious symbol of welcome, typically made with
colored rice flour. In 2008, a devout Hindu resident of a Virginia CIC painted
a kolam on their driveway rather than using rice flour because of expected
rain. The association fined the family $900 for failing to keep their driveway
asphalt in its “original black state.” Annie Gowen, Driveway Painting Tests
Religious Freedom, WASH. POST (Dec. 8 2008), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2008-12-08/news/36795471_1_kolam-driveway-hindu.
67
Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303 (1998) [hereinafter Hyatt,
Common Interest Communities] (explaining that the property application of
constitutional principles to CIC governance is an unsettled area of the law).
There are occasional cases that test the application of constitutional protections
to CIC governance actions, and the most emotionally charged cases do much
to muddy the jurisprudence in this area. An example is Gerber v. Longboat
Condominium, in which a CIC denied a veteran’s right to fly an American
flag. The court found that this act violated the owner’s constitutional rights.
724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989), aff’d in part on reh’g, Gerber v.
Longboat Condo., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1991). During the
post-9/11 patriotic fervor, Congress felt compelled to pass a law guaranteeing
the right of homeowners to fly Old Glory. The Freedom to Display the
American Flag Act, codified at 4 U.S.C.A. § 5 (2012), prohibits a CIC from
adopting or enforcing any policy that would unreasonably restrict or prevent a
member of the association from displaying the flag of the United States. See
Robin Miller, Annotation, Restrictive Covenants or Homeowners’ Association

Regulations Restricting or Prohibiting Flags, Signage, or the Like on
Homeowner’s Property as Restraint on Free Speech, 51 A.L.R. 6TH 533
(2010) (cataloguing the various statutes that impact flag display and other “free
speech” rights in CICs).
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violat[ive of] some fundamental constitutional right of unit
owners,” covenants contained in a CIC’s original declaration are
presumptively valid.68 Public policy and constitutional constraints
on the substance of CIC covenants are quite limited, and in the
vast majority of cases, covenants are upheld. Courts and scholars
reason that “[t]he initial members of a homeowners association,
by their voluntary acts of joining, unanimously consent to the
provisions in the association’s original governing documents.” 69
Covenant amendments or rules enacted by the board of directors,
however, are subject to slightly more judicial oversight, although
the proper standard of review for such association or board
actions is subject to some debate.70 Some courts use the Business
Judgment Rule, borrowed from corporate law,71 in order to assess
the validity of CIC governing acts.72 Other courts claim that CIC
amendments and rules must be “reasonable” in order to be
valid.73 And some jurisdictions use both tests: the more
permissive Business Judgment Rule when associations are
performing “business responsibilities” and the slightly less
deferential rule of reasonableness when associations are engaging
in community “governance.”74 The problem with this approach is
68

Apple II Condo. Ass’n v. Worth Bank & Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93, 98
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995); see also Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878
P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994); Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637,
639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
69
Ellickson, supra note 49, at 1526–27.
70
HYATT, supra note 4, at 89–97.
71
The Business Judgment Rule is not a standard of conduct but rather a
standard of review. DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, Ch. 2, § A2 (4th ed. 1993 &
Supp. 1995); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 472 A.2d 802, 812 (Del. 1984)
(explaining the application of the business judgment rule as procedural, rather
than substantive, judicial oversight).
72
See, e.g., Schwarzmann v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of
Bridgehaven, 655 P.2d 1177 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
73
See, e.g., Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass’n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d
1223, 1234 (Cal. 2004); Noble v. Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 270 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1993).
74
HYATT, supra note 4, at 89.
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that it is difficult to determine when an association is acting as a
business and when it is acting as a government, since “there is no
bright line between the two” roles.75
The Business Judgment Rule is a deliberately deferential
standard of review. Under this standard, “absent a showing of
fraud, dishonesty, or incompetence, it is not the court’s job to
second-guess the actions of directors.”76 According to the
Business Judgment Rule, if a business decision is made in good
faith based on an honestly held rational belief that the decision is
in the best interest of the entity, courts will not critique the
decision.77 When applying the rule of reason, on the other hand,
courts purport to balance the benefit of a particular governing act
against its cost. In reality, however, courts do not engage in any
precise cost-benefit analysis, and simply consider generally
whether the particular governing act pertains to “the health,
happiness and peace of mind of the unit owners.”78 The burden is
on a complaining homeowner to prove a lack of nexus, and that a
CIC governing act is therefore unreasonable.79
Many scholars and judges conclude that this hands-off
approach is appropriate because of freedom of contract. These
commentators opine that there should be no real substantive
judicial oversight of CIC governing acts and provisions.80 The
proper role for a court, under this formulation, is to ensure the
good faith of the decision-makers and the integrity of the process.
75
76
77

Id.
Schwarzmann, 655 P.2d at 1181.
See Aronson v. Lewis, 472 A.2d 802, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining the

application of the business judgment rule as procedural, rather than
substantive, judicial oversight); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1045
(Pa. 1997).
78
E.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181–
82; (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Preserve at Forrest Crossing Townhome Ass’n
v. DeVaughn, No. M2011-02755-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 396000 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 30, 2013). See also infra notes 89–96 and accompanying text.
79
HYATT, supra note 4, at 88–97.
80
See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 906, 920 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein, Covenants and
Constitutions].
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Other scholars justify a more robust judicial review of covenant
amendments and rule-making, asserting that courts have the
power to make a substantive inquiry as to whether an association
is acting within its scope of authority and whether the action
bears a rational relationship to legitimate purposes of the CIC.81
In the corporate context, the Business Judgment Rule is
justified based on judicial policy of leaving business decisions to
the business experts. In the context of CIC governance, the
decision-makers are volunteer laypeople, not corporate
executives.82 Nevertheless, the several courts that have embraced
the Business Judgment Rule standard to review CIC governance
have failed to note this difference in context. For example, New
York’s Superior Court, in Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave.
Apartment Corp., acknowledged that “[e]ven when the governing
board acts within the scope of its authority, some check on its
potential powers to regulate residents’ conduct, life-style and
property rights is necessary,” but then it concluded that the
Business Judgment Rule is the most appropriate standard of
review to achieve that “check” on association power.83 According
to the Levandusky court, adopting the Business Judgment Rule
means that judges should not inquire into actions taken in good
faith “in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate
purposes.”84 California agreed with New York’s Levandusky
opinion and adopted the Business Judgment Rule approach to CIC
governance in Lamden v. LaJolla Shores Clubdominium
Homeowners Ass’n.85 Thus, in at least the two of the most
populous states, CIC governance decisions are unconstrained by
HYATT, supra note 4, at 98; see also Joseph William Singer, The Rule
of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1414 (2013).
81

82

CICs are really not corporations in the traditional sense. For example,
they are not staffed by professional corporate directors and there are no
disinterested directors. HYATT, supra note 4, at 90.
83
Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 554 N.Y.S.2d 807,
811 (1990).
84
Id. The court specifically rejected the reasonableness standard adopted
by the appellate court.
85
980 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1999) (finding that Business Judgment Rule applies
regardless of corporate form for CIC association board actions).
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any substantive judicial oversight.
Other jurisdictions purport to apply the rule of reason in
assessing the validity of CIC governance. The courts’ use of
reasonable review theoretically includes an element of subjective
review, but in practice, reasonableness review of CIC actions
focuses almost exclusively on whether the association followed
the enumerated procedures in amending the CC&Rs or passing
community rules.86 Although most courts assert that only
“reasonable” governing acts will be upheld, courts rarely explain
what this standard means or engage in any methodical balancing
of equities.87 In many cases, courts have essentially defined
reasonable to include anything that could possibly promote
community purposes, typically defined as preserving and
improving property values and owner “lifestyle.”88 In circular
logic, some courts give the board of the CIC association the
discretion to determine which of its governing acts are
“reasonable.”89 Meanwhile, other courts claim to require
reasonableness but instead actually apply the Business Judgment
Rule standard of review.90
86
87

See Hyatt, Common Interest Communities, supra note 67, at 354.
Id. Robert C. Ellickson opined that “reasonableness” in CIC

jurisprudence means different things to different courts. Ellickson opposed
“reasonableness” review in the name of freedom of contract. He stated:
“Reasonable,” the most ubiquitous legal adjective, is not
self-defining. In reviewing an association’s legislative or
administrative decisions, many judges have viewed the
“reasonableness” standard as entitling them to undertake an
independent cost-benefit analysis of the decision under
review and to invalidate association decisions that are not
cost-justified by general societal standards. This variant of
reasonableness
review
ignores
the
contractarian
underpinnings of the private association.
Ellickson, supra note 49, at 1530.
88
See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290
(Cal. 1994); Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. Ass’n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983); Laguna Royale Owners Ass’n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
89
See Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
90
Papalexiou v. Tower West Condo, 401 A.2d 280, 284 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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Considering the actual approach that most courts use in
analyzing the validity of CIC amendments and rulemaking, the
distinction between the various purported standards of review
blurs. Although different jurisdictions purport to adopt distinct
oversight standards, in effect, most courts approach this issue in
essentially the same way: original covenants are presumptively
valid, and covenant amendments and rules adopted in accordance
with the procedures enumerated in the declaration are also valid
unless they are arbitrary or promulgated in bad faith.91 In Lieber
v. Point Loma Tennis Club, for example, the court held that a
regulation is deemed “reasonable” if it is not arbitrary and there
are valid reasons that an association might choose to enact the
rule.92 This standard is not a cost-benefit balancing test, but
rather mirrors oversight in administrative law, upholding rules
duly enacted as long as they are not arbitrary and capricious.93
Regardless of standard used, courts almost universally uphold and
enforce CIC covenants and regulations.
II. THE COVENANT—CONTRACT MISMATCH

A. Adhesion and “Assent”
If contracts are not voluntary, the liberty and efficiency
justifications for their enforcement evaporate. In the context of
standard form and adhesion contracting, the voluntariness
associated with freedom of contract is diminished.94 Nevertheless,
Ch. Div. 1979).
91
HYATT, supra note 4, at 56–57.
92
Lieber v. Point Loma Tennis Club, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 788–89 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (finding that if it is not arbitrary, meaning there are valid
reasons that an association might choose a regulation, it is “reasonable”).
93
See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Note, Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV.
647 (1981); see also HYATT, supra note 4, at 58. The lack of substantive
review of CIC covenants has inspired calls for a return to a robust “touch and
concern” test as a way of reigning in CICs. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note
31, at 293–94.
94
In adhesion contracts, “[a]ctual assent is not just a fiction because of
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contracting pursuant to a non-negotiable standard form,
particularly in agreements between parties of disparate bargaining
power, is an increasingly common facet of modern reality,95 and
courts have uniformly upheld the enforceability of adhesion
contracts absent some special circumstance.96 Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize that contractual theory imperfectly fits
with the reality of non-negotiable forms.97 Standard, boilerplate
terms are rarely read or negotiated.98 The resulting contractual
voluntary choices by consumers; it is effectively impossible.” Alan M. White
& Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
233, 242 (2002); see also Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped
the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 332 (1999); Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of
Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1035 (2010).
95
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991); Todd
D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1174, 1225 (1983) [hereinafter Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion];
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943). Generally, courts find that a
non-negotiable standard form contract “offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis”
by a party with superior sophistication and bargaining power is an “adhesion
contract.” David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and
Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 432 (2009).
96
Nw. Nat’l. Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990).
Modern contractual theory is based on objective manifestation of assent rather
than subjective “meeting of the minds.” An indication of assent such as
clicking “I accept” to posted terms or by initialing a form contract is clearly
sufficient for legally binding obligation. Russell A. Hakes, Focusing on the

Realities of the Contracting Process—an Essential Step to Achieve Justice in
Contract Enforcement, 12 DEL. L. REV. 95, 99–100 (2011).
97

Several scholars have articulated the problematic disconnect between
freedom of contract rhetoric and theory and the realities of the contracting
process in the context of standard, non-negotiable forms. E.g., Hakes, supra
note 96, at 96.
98
One April Fools’ Day, British retailer GameStation added a clause to its
posted terms and conditions providing that customers were selling their
“immortal souls” to the retailer. Approximately 88% of the contracting
customers did not opt out of this clause. 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly
Sold Their Souls, FOX NEWS (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/
2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-souls/. Scholarly consensus
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substance therefore represents one party’s demands and the
other’s acquiescence rather than jointly determined content.
Although enforceable, the terms of such a contract do not
necessarily reflect mutual intent.99 And when a contract’s terms
are not actually elected by both parties, the contract does not
necessarily promote efficient outcomes or create wealth.100
supports the conclusion that standard form contracts are rarely read. Margaret
Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of
Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231–32 (2006); Todd D. Rakoff, The
Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 1237–38 (2006)
[hereinafter Rakoff, Law and Sociology]; Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond

Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for
Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 469 (2008); Hakes, supra note 96, at 100. Recently, Judge Richard

Posner publicly admitted that he never read the documents he signed at his
mortgage loan closing. David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually Read Boilerplate
Contracts?, ABOVE THE LAW (June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM)
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actaully-read-boilerplatecontracts-judge-richard-posner-doesnt-do-you/.
99
This can result in standard contract language that works to the detriment
of both parties, but somehow persists in light of adverse interpretation. See
MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2012);
Andrea J. Boyack, Sovereign Debt and The Three and a Half Minute
Transaction: What Sticky Boilerplate Reveals About Contract Law and
Practice, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2013).
100
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3, 9, 48–49
(8th ed. 2010) (explaining that rational self-interest and voluntary contracting
is why transactions are efficient); Howard C. Ellis, Employment-at-Will and
Contract Principles: The Paradigm of Pennsylvania, 96 DICK. L. REV. 595,
596–97 (1992) (explaining that voluntary contracting promotes efficiency).
Economic theory posits that optimal efficiency results when individuals may
contract freely, and judicial protection of the future expectations created by
contracts increases societal wealth. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT
LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 10, 22–23 (1965).
Wealth maximization through contract enforcement is a foundational concept
in the law. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 157
(2000) (“Law is the instrument that fixes and realizes capital.”); Morris R.
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 562–63 (1933) (“[A]
regime in which contracts are freely made and generally enforced gives greater
scope to individual initiative and thus promotes the greatest wealth of a
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Adhesion contracts are enforceable, but legal theory has
evolved to take into account the lack of voluntariness and content
input inherent in adhesion contexts through modern doctrines
such as unconscionability101 and distinct approaches to
interpretation for adhesion contracts.102 Courts recognize that
traditional deference to contractual terms may be inappropriate
for contracts of adhesion, and they therefore sometimes monitor
the substantive fairness of a contract in an adhesion contract
context.103 This paternalistic approach diverges markedly from
traditional hands-off contract enforcement and has led some
observers to opine that contract law is now evolving along two
nation.”). Economic theory asserts that unfairness and social inefficiencies in
form contracts will be winnowed out through market competition, but this
theory incorrectly assumes unbounded rationality of the consumer. The
realities of adhesion contracting processes and consumer rationality undercut
this theory and permit inefficient and socially unjustified terms to persist even
in a free market. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003).
101
See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include
an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”).
102
When a written contract has been drafted solely by one party, courts
invoke the doctrine of contra proferentum (“against the offeror”) that “requires
that ambiguity in non-negotiated or adhesion contracts to be construed against
the profferer.” Karnette v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 444 F. Supp. 2d
640, 647 (E.D. Va. 2006). In the context of adhesion contracts, courts
sometimes construe a contract “to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the
average member of the public who accepts it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. E (1981); see also C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Iowa 1975).
103
See Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 975 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), aff’d, 1 A.3d 678 (N.J. 2010) (explaining that in
adhesion contracts, a court should consider the “substantive contents of the
agreement” as well as the process that led to its execution); C & J Fertilizer,
227 N.W.2d at 174–75 (explaining that the court is responsible for exercising
oversight with respect to the fairness and content of terms in a contract of
adhesion). Professor Rakoff advocates that adhesion contracts be considered
presumptively unenforceable. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note
95, at 1176.
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tracks: a traditional assessment of process-based oversight for
agreements between equally situated parties and a protective,
regulatory approach with respect to “unsophisticated parties” in
contracts of adhesion.104
Contract theorists justify the enforceability of contracts of
adhesion with reference to market forces that will act to monitor
and constrain the content of such contracts.105 But market checks
only work when the market provides choices. It is increasingly
true that in many areas of the country, most home purchase
options are in CICs.106 Shopping around among various CICs
Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New
Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493 (2010); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 545
(2003); see also L & L Wings, Inc. v. Marco-Destin, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d
104

359 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that party sophistication and bargaining power
should be a factor to consider in determining whether a liquidated damages
provision is enforceable). This latter approach has more in common with the
European policy of prospectively approving the substance of form contracts
prior to enforcement. See LEONE NIGLIA, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CONTRACT IN EUROPE (2003) (explaining how contract law in Europe has
evolved to deal with standard form contracts).
105
See James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory

Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and
Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1, 29–32 (1989) (explaining the theory

that “marginal consumers” will operate as market checks on overreaching by
drafters of non-negotiable forms).
106
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1113–14; Steven Siegel, The

Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of
Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After
Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 469 (1998) [hereinafter
Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government]; see also ROBERT JAY
DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 38 (1992) (“Although [CICs] do provide more
consumer options in the abstract, in many areas of the country [associationrelated housing] now dominate[s] the local housing market and [is]
increasingly offering fairly uniform levels and types of services.”); JOEL
GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 189 (1991) (“If you want
a new home, it is increasingly difficult to get one that doesn’t come with a
homeowners’ association.”); Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra
note 2, at 59 (“The states with recent growth booms . . . have the highest
percentage of citizens residing in privately governed CICs.”).
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offers no real choice either: most CIC declarations are virtually
identical.107 In this context, market forces cannot justify the
content of a contract of adhesion.
CIC declarations clearly fit the definition of an adhesion
contract.108 Terms of a declaration are completely non-negotiable;
in fact, prior to contracting they are prescribed and recorded in
the land records.109 In addition, because one form binds multiple
parties, no party has the ability to diverge from the recorded
provisions. It is a perfect example of “take-it-or-leave-it”
contracting.
Furthermore, CIC covenants are bundled with a real estate
purchase. If a would-be buyer does not agree to the terms, she
must relinquish the right to buy that property. Since each parcel
of real property is presumed unique in our legal system,110 a
buyer who forgoes a particular purchase has no true substitute.
Homebuyers consider numerous factors in choosing which parcel
See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1113–14 (“There exists no
meaningful consumer choice amongst CIC organizational structures. In
general, developer-imposed CIC templates are remarkably uniform.”). Even if
buyers could shop around based on the particular provisions of a given CIC
regime, this would be unlikely. Buyers often do not see the CIC declaration
and associated documents until at or close to closing, and at closing, disclosure
requirements mandate that a tremendous amount of paperwork is given to
buyers. The sheer volume provided minimizes the likelihood that the buyer
will review or understand the disclosures. Note, Judicial Review of
Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 647, 650 (1981).
108
C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174–
75 (Iowa 1975). Professor Rakoff has enumerated seven criteria that indicate a
contract of adhesion: standard form drafted by one party who engages in
repeated transactions of the sort presented as non-negotiable to the adhering
party who enters into relatively few transactions of the sort, signed by the
adhering party, and principally obligates the adhering party to pay money.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 95, at 1177.
109
See Winokur, supra note 105, at 33 (concluding that such “built-in,
substantive limitations on modification of uniform servitude forms present
obstacles to market discipline by marginal consumers”).
110
See Shelton v. Keller, 748 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988);
Real Estate Analytics, LLC v. Vallas, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 835, 836 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008).
107
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of real property to buy, including school districts, lot size and
configuration, tax assessment and appraisal, quality of
construction, and even such things as the smell of the home and
the orientation and exposure to natural light.111 The content of
CIC covenants and rules is likely not even a factor considered
prior to purchase or, if considered, is a fairly unimportant detail
in the home purchase calculus.
UCIOA and statutes in virtually every state mandate that a
seller of real property disclose the details of a private governance
regime prior to or at the closing of a real estate purchase.112
However the delivery of pages upon pages of legalese at or
shortly before closing may do little to actually inform a buyer.113
111

The Department of Housing and Urban Development has even
promulgated a homebuyer checklist to help purchasers track important aspects
of properties they may buy. While extensive, the checklist does not explicitly
discuss the scope or content of CIC governing provisions, although it does
bring up “pet restrictions” as a line item for consideration. Aside from pet
restrictions, however, the only reference to neighborhood covenants is a line
item as to whether they are “good, average or poor” (whatever that means).
For more information on the HUD homebuyer checklist and related
documents, see Buying a Home, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/buying_a_home (last visited
Feb. 13, 2014).
112
E.g., UCIOA, supra note 22, § 4; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35.7102 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.401 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 508D-3.5 (West 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47E-4 (West 2013).
113
The quantity of disclosures made in connection with a real estate
purchase diminishes the ability of the disclosures to truly inform. See, e.g.,
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Comment, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305
(1986) (finding that “consumers who are faced with the dense text of form
contracts characteristically respond by refusing to read”). Timing of disclosure
in real estate conveyancing—in particular, disclosures made after a buyer has
made an offer on a home—diminishes disclosure effectiveness as well.
Stephanie Stern, Temporal Dynamics of Disclosure: The Example of
Residential Real Estate Conveyancing, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 57. Recent studies
of home mortgagors found that these buyers misapprehend or fail to read even
the most basic parts of mortgage loan disclosure forms. Debra Pogrund Stark,
et al., Ineffective in Any Form: How Confirmation Bias and Distractions
Undermine Improved Home-Loan Disclosures, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 377,
379 (2013) (explaining that studies of consumers show that they have
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Typically, homebuyers are not represented by counsel in home
purchase negotiations,114 and legal counsel conducting real estate
closings do not generally undertake to review and advise the
buyer with respect to CIC obligations.115 Under these
circumstances, it is highly unlikely that a buyer reads or
understands CC&Rs prior to closing.
Finally, assent to the CIC terms does not even require a
specific manifestation of acceptance thereof; rather, a party is
deemed to have agreed simply by buying the land. Although this
is true for any servitude, it is not the general rule for contract
law, where a voluntary act manifesting intent to be bound is
prerequisite to obligation.116 This simple fact further divorces true
assent from legal obligation in the context of CIC covenants.

B. Servitude Damages and Duration
In the name of liberty and market freedom, our legal system
generally eschews perpetual obligation and permits individuals to
elect to walk away from their commitments (after payment of

“miss[ed] the critical information that disclosure forms were designed to
communicate”).
114
Most homeowners do not employ counsel to represent them in the
conveyancing transaction. Debra Pogrund Stark et. al., Dysfunctional

Contracts and the Laws and Practices That Enable Them: An Empirical
Analysis, 46 IND. L. REV. 797, 801 (2013). Nor do buyers typically even have

a realtor representing their interests because the agent working with a buyer is
legally a seller’s sub-agent. The agent that works with the buyer is, in fact,
often a seller’s subagent. Ann Morales Olazabal, Redefining Realtor
Relationships and Responsibilities: The Failure of State Regulatory Responses ,
40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 65, 66 (2003).
115
Lawyers who conduct residential real estate closings typically prepare
the deed and coordinate with the title company and mortgage lender, if
applicable, with respect to recordation. Such counsel facilitates the closing, but
does not actually advise the buyer or assist buyer in reviewing disclosure
documents. Gary D. Beelen, Odds Are, It’s Not “Your” Closing Attorney, 21
DREW ECKL & FARNHAM, LLP J., no. 126, 2009, at 1, 1–5, available at
http://www.deflaw.com/articles/odds-are-its-not-your-closing-attorney.
116
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (1981).
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appropriate damages), and obtain a “clean slate.”117 The law
reasonably protects a contracting party’s future autonomy from
inescapable restraint by allowing exit via breach and
reimbursement of the non-breaching party’s expectation interest
in nearly all cases.118 Although breach typically provides an exit
from perpetual contract obligation, when contracts take on an in
rem character, attaching to real property as servitudes, that exit
closes. Servitudes are generally enforced through “property”
rules,119 meaning that the default remedy is specific
performance.120 When an obligation is specifically enforceable, a
See NATHALIE MARTIN & OCEAN TAMA, BANKRUPTCY LAW: WHAT
MATTERS AND WHY 24–25 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that “a fresh start is
deeply embedded in the American dream.”). For example, Bankruptcy law
offers an exit from perpetual debt. Id.; see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234 (1934). There are a few exceptions to perpetual debt obligation. See
generally Kurtis K. Wiard, Comment, Brunner’s Folly: The Road to
Discharging Student Loans Is Paved with Unfounded Optimism , 52
WASHBURN L.J. 357 (2013) (explaining bankruptcy courts’ varied applications
of “undue hardship” in the student loan context). Employment law preserves
exit from perpetual commitments of labor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981) (“A promise to render personal service will not
be specifically enforced.”). Several states have passed statutes prohibiting
specific performance of a personal service contract. See, e.g., MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-412. And family law freely permits divorce. Peter Nash Swisher,
Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 271 (1997)
(discussing the “no-fault divorce revolution” of the past half-century).
118
See POSNER, supra note 100, at 149–51; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). Specific performance is
only available when an award of damages would not be adequate and various
equitable requirements are met. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §16.1–.6 (4th ed. 1998). See also Ben Depoorter &
Stephan Tontrup, How Law Frames Moral Intuitions: The Expressive Effect of
Specific Performance, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 673, 717 (2012).
119
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral , 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972). For a thorough discussion of how remedies in the case of CIC
covenant violations unjustifiably diverge from contract damages, see Amos B.
Elberg, Note, Remedies for Common Interest Development Rule Violations,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1958 (2001).
120
Winokur, supra note 105, at 37 (“[T]he general availability of specific
117

2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX

800

5/19/2014 11:27 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

party cannot opt out of the continuing affirmative requirement to
comply.
Servitudes depart from contract law in another key aspect that
impacts individual liberty—their potentially infinite duration. A
servitude obligation—unlike a contract—presumptively exists in
perpetuity, binding against current and future owners of the land,
and cannot be terminated through breach.121 For servitudes,
contracting decisions today limit not only the contracting parties’
own future freedom but also the freedom of future generations of
property owners.122 Problems of dead-hand control are thus
endemic to covenants that run with the land.123 Under the
common law, however, courts are generally empowered to strike
down covenants that unduly restrain alienation on the basis of
public policy.124 First-generation CICs created before widespread
performance as a remedial alternative to damages precludes an owner’s
unilateral election to breach the servitude and pay damages.”). Issuing a
mandatory injunction is the typical way that restrictive covenants are enforced.
See, e.g., Depeyster v. Town of Santa Claus, 729 N.E.2d 183, 190 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000); Metzner v. Wojdyla, 886 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1994). Servitude law
draws a distinction between specifically enforceable equitable servitudes and
real covenants that are enforceable through a grant of money damage, but this
is a distinction without a difference. A given covenant-based servitude can be
the subject of an action either in equity or in law at a plaintiff’s election, and it
is easier to prove equitable grounds for recovery. See Runyon v. Paley, 416
S.E.2d 177, 182–83 (N.C. 1992); JAMES L. WINOKUR ET AL., PROPERTY AND
LAWYERING 642–43 (2002); Alfred L. Brophy, Contemplating When Equitable
Servitudes Run with the Land, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 698 (2002).
121
See Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson, 906 P.2d 1314,
1320 (Cal. 1995); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275,
1283 (Cal. 1994); Thodos v. Shirk, 79 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Iowa 1956); Arnold
v. Chandler, 428 A.2d 1235, 1237 (N.H. 1981).
122
CIC covenants can be modified through supermajority vote of
community members, but it is both cumbersome and practically difficult to
amend CIC declarations.
123
See HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, 2 TIFFANY REAL PROP. §
392 (3d ed. 2013); see also Earle v. Int’l Paper Co., 429 So. 2d 989, 995
(Ala. 1983). The (in)famous Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to
servitudes. See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass’n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr.
136, 144. (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
124
See, e.g., City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 265 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279
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common interest ownership statutes were enacted in the 1970s
and 1980s were cognizant of the common law’s hostility toward
perpetual restrictions on land and contained expiration dates.125
Today, statutes in every state explicitly or implicitly authorize
CIC ownership structures, and courts routinely uphold CIC
covenants even without effective temporal limits.126 Because CIC
covenants have a virtually unlimited duration, their impact and
effect is more expansive than contract law. Without durational
restraints, substantive limitations are more justifiable. A CIC
covenant that has an expansive or troubling scope—one that ties
up land alienability or impacts personal freedoms, for example—
will not eventually just disappear. If courts lack the tools to
constrain the subject matter of covenants, it may be impossible to
nullify the legal impact of such covenants, even if the covenant
eventually contradicts the values of society as a whole or the
impacted neighborhood in general.
Servitudes come in several flavors and have different, and
evolving, legal formation requirements. Modernly, servitudes are
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (balancing the purposes of a restriction against the level
of restrictiveness to determine validity); Cast v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce
Trust & Savs. Ass’n of Lincoln, 183 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Neb. 1971) (finding
restrictions on alienation in a fee simple estate “void and against public
policy”); Mountain Springs Ass’n v. Wilson, 196 A.2d 270, 276 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1963) (invalidating an unreasonable restraint on alienation);
Eagle Enter, Inc. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 508 (1976) (refusing to enforce an
affirmative covenant as an unreasonable restraint on alienation); Gregory v.
State Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 495 A.2d 997, 1000,
1002 (R.I. 1985) (reinterpreting a covenant to promote free alienability). In
addition, most states have statutes granting judiciaries the power to invalidate
restraints on alienation. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 711. (West 2012).
125
See Welshire, Inc. v. Harbison, 91 A.2d 404 (Del. Ch. 1952) (30
years); Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194 (Ill. 1913) (43 years); Easton v.
Careybrook Co., 123 A.2d 342 (Md. Ct. App. 1956) (8-year initial term, then
continued until modification by vote of majority of owners).
126
Typically, CIC restrictions provide for automatic renewal after a given
initial term. Under the law of Louisiana, however, restrictions imposing
affirmative obligations cannot exist in perpetuity. Diefenthal v. Longue Vue
Found., 865 So. 2d 863, 882 (La. Ct. App. 2004), writ denied, 869 So. 2d
883 (La.).
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generally grouped into easements and covenants.127 The variant
closest to a conveyance is the easement—a right to make
beneficial use of another’s land.128 Covenants running with the
land, on the other hand, are closer in form and substance to
contracts among neighbors, although of unlimited duration and
specifically enforceable.129 Drawing the line between contracts
that bind only the parties thereto and covenants that run with the
land, thus binding on future owners is maddeningly difficult.130
The law of servitude formation has been progressing from a more
formalistic approach that demanded strict adherence to formal
requirements of privity and property relevance (the so-called
“touch and concern” requirement) toward a more liberalized
approach such as that advocated by the Restatement (Third) of
Property.131 Under the Third Restatement’s approach, anything
that a valid contract can achieve can now be achieved in
perpetuity by a covenant. This approach offers nothing to
constrain the content of covenants aside from public policy limits
that apply to contracts generally. Once, the touch and concern
rule for valid formation of real covenants operated to limit the

127

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.3 (2000) no longer
uses the terms “real covenant” and “equitable servitude” to distinguish
between types of covenants. Instead, the Restatement calls both covenants
created in writing and enforceable at law and a servitude implied in equity
“covenants.”
128
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 (2000) defines
“easement” as a “nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession
of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized
by the easement.” A “profit” is closely related to an easement, except that it
additionally gives the beneficiary the right to extract something from the
burdened land. Id.
129
The current Restatement of Property departs from the use of the terms
“real covenant” and “equitable servitude,” to refer to contracts that run with
the land and therefore take on the character of property. Id. § 1.4.
130
E.g., Barton v. Fred Netterville Lumber Co., 317 F. Supp. 2d 700,
704 (S.D. Miss. 2004); Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 248 S.E.2d 904, 907 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1978).
131
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.1, 3.1, & 3.7
(2000). See also supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text.
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scope of perpetually restraining covenants,132 but as this
requirement has been watered down and in some cases (per the
new Restatement’s approach) eliminated, little substantive control
remains with respect to what types of obligations real covenants
can impose.133 Some courts purport to limit covenant enforcement
to obligations that are “reasonable,”134 but many courts only
apply reasonableness restraint to CIC covenant amendments, not
the original covenants. Furthermore, the test for reasonableness is
not rigorously nor consistently applied.135
Servitude restrictions on land use preserve the status quo.
Although this may be the very goal sought by the authors of the
servitude, perpetual real property stasis imposes future
opportunity costs. Servitude rigidity is potentially problematic for
all easements and covenants, but most recent scholarly debate on
the costs of rigidity has focused on the context of conservation
servitudes.136 Conservation servitudes restrain use of land
132

Scholars who argue that covenants should be completely analogized to
contracts have been the most vocal critics of the touch and concern test in the
context of common interest communities. E.g., Epstein, Covenants and
Constitution, supra note 80.
133
Without substantive limits on the scope of CIC covenants,
neighborhood private laws can “dictate basic aspects of a resident’s mode of
living within the privacy of his or her own unit.” Armand Arabian, Condos,
Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1
(1995).
134
E.g., White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351 (Fla.
1979) (pre-FHA amendment case upholding age restrictions on condominium
occupancy as “reasonable”); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878
P.2d 1275, 1283 (Cal. 1994) (“[O]ur Legislature has made common interest
development use restrictions contained in a project’s recorded declaration
‘enforceable . . . unless unreasonable.’” (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted)).
135
See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
136
For a definition and overview of conservation easements, see Michael
R. Eitel, Comment, Wyoming’s Trepidation Toward Conservation Easement
Legislation: A Look at Two Issues Troubling the Wyoming State Legislature ,
4 WYO. L. REV. 57, 59 (2004). Conservation servitudes “present a difficult
choice among conflicting social values. Although authorization of private
conservation servitudes in gross reinforces freedom of contract, promotes the
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indefinitely and are deliberately difficult to terminate.137 Placing
perpetual burdens on land ignores the possibility of unexpected
changes in land use needs.138 Even though today’s perfect
candidate for conservation may be better allocated in the future to
development, legally un-burdening land from servitude restraints
benefits of private initiative, and assists conservation of the natural
environment, other important social policies suffer.” Korngold, Privately Held
Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27, at 435. The term “conservation
easements” is a misnomer because such servitudes are not non-possessory use
rights of a non-owner but instead are restrictions on an owner’s ability to use
her own land. Id. at 436–37. There are some key differences between CIC
restraints on transfer and conservation servitudes, most importantly that the
former involves a restriction on alienation and the latter only restrains use.
137
Id. at 439–43. Indeed, the whole point of conservation easements is to
render future land development impossible. Id. at 479, 453–54; see also Julia
D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future,
88 VA. L. REV. 739, 767 (2002) (“[C]onservation servitudes can achieve their
goals if and only if the future options of owners of burdened land are
constrained.”).
138
Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27, at
479. Some scholars have advocated a periodic review by courts to determine
whether the easement merits continued validity or should be stricken as a
matter of fairness or efficiency. Gerald Korngold, Resolving the

Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free Markets
and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525
(2007) [hereinafter Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts];
Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation
Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Use
Land Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039 [hereinafter Korngold, Solving the
Contentious Issues]. Another approach would be to make the beneficiaries of
such easements public entities, constrained by the democratic process. See
Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27. Other
scholars contend that the perpetual validity of conservation servitudes must be
vigorously upheld. See Jessica E. Jay, When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The

Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual
Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012); Nancy A.
McLaughlin & Mark Benjamin Machlis, Protecting the Public Interest and
Investment in Conservation: A Response to Professor Korngold’s Critique of
Conservation Easements, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1561; Nancy A. McLaughlin &
W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements , 9 WYO. L. REV. 1
(2009).
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may be impracticable.139 Future generations will bear the costs of
today’s land restraints.140 These same worries regarding unlimited
duration and specific enforceability that have engendered much
debate in the context of conservation easements also apply to
community CC&Rs. Such covenants impose a particular vision of
community use and behavior that is resistant to change and
difficult to avoid.

C. Covenant Predictability and Community Exit
Although any type of perpetual covenant may become onerous
and undesirable over time, the content of community CC&Rs are
less rigid than conservation servitudes and other types of
easements and covenants. Unlike traditional servitudes, CIC
covenants can be amended by community vote.141 This flexibility
mitigates some of the concerns otherwise posed by the unlimited
duration of CIC servitudes. The ability to amend covenants is
also a great advantage to the CIC structure compared with earlier
neighborhood deed restriction schemes that provided no method
for modification or termination of servitude restraints. But the
See Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27;
Mahoney, supra note 137, at 769; see also Federico Cheever, Public Good and
139

Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A
Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077, 1098
(1996).
140

Several scholars have focused on the issue of perpetual validity of
conservation servitudes and have pointed out that the status quo may not give
adequate weight to the costs of alienation restraints. E.g., Cheever, supra note
139; Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27;
Mahoney, supra note 137; Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing
World: A Call for the End of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 144 (2011).
141
CIC declarations can be amended by prescribed procedures, typically
by supermajority vote of the owners. UCIOA provides that the declaration may
be amended with a 67% affirmative vote unless the declaration specifies a
different percentage or certain occupancy rules are impacted (threshold in that
case is 80%). UCIOA, supra note 22, § 2-117. In addition to amending
covenants, association boards enact (and change) implementing rules and
regulations from time to time as they see fit.
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benefit of flexibility is achieved at the cost of predictability.
Because CC&R establish a dynamic association government,
CICs are more adaptable than regimes that are controlled solely
by the rigid provisions of a recorded document, but the changing
nature of obligation in the case of CICs renders the obligation
itself more difficult to justify on contractual reliance grounds.142
Thus, there are two opposite problems potentially posed by the
possibility of changing CIC governing provisions. First, changes
may be too difficult to achieve and may not in fact be
forthcoming even when changing circumstances so warrant.
Second, rule changes may be inspired by the whims of vocal
neighborhood minorities and not actually reflect changing
circumstances or new community values. If changes are nonunanimous (as is almost universally the case), then it is more
difficult to justify the application of such changes to dissenting
homeowners based on their supposed assent. Furthermore,
unforeseen changes to community covenants may frustrate the
reasonable expectations and desires of dissenting owners who
bought into a community that was governed by a different set of
substantive rules.
Theoretically, a community’s ability to amend covenant
restrictions should provide a means to update neighborhood
governance to reflect new cultural preferences and technological
changes impacting property use. In reality, covenants are difficult
to amend.143 Whether a given community is able to mobilize
sufficient votes for a given amendment turns on the idiosyncratic
concerns of owners and the level of popular participation in the
community.144 When restrictions in recorded declarations are
See Brower, supra note 20, at 242 (noting that CIC enforcement is
justified based on the unanimous assent of its members to covenant terms and
explaining that later amendments “pose special problems”).
143
Amendments to CC&Rs are difficult to achieve in reality because of
the generally low level of community engagement and participation coupled
with the high levels of required assent. See generally Sterk, supra note 10.
144
STEPHEN E. BARTON & CAROL J. SILVERMAN, COMMON INTEREST
HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS MANAGEMENT STUDY (Cal. Dep’t Real Estate
ed., 1987) (showing low levels of participation in community governance and
concluding that many communities are not governed according to majority
142
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difficult to modify, outdated laws will govern behavior and land
use in the community. For example, many CC&Rs drafted in the
1970s and 1980s prohibit “satellite dishes,” based on the concern
over blocked views and the unsightly nature of enormous satellite
dishes such as those used at the time.145 Today’s satellite dishes
are tiny and unobtrusive, yet covenants banning “satellite dishes”
remain legally binding until they are removed by a
supermajority.146 Other covenant restrictions that commonly
persist, despite being criticized as obsolete, include prohibitions
on trucks and laundry lines. Such blanket prohibitions seem
unwarranted based on the modern trends of, respectively, driving
a small pick-up truck as a passenger vehicle147 and air-drying of
clothes in an effort to be more eco-friendly.148 It would appear,
desires but rather the idiosyncratic concerns of a vocal minority).
145
See River Oaks Place Council of Co-Owners v. Daly, 172 S.W.3d
314, 325 (Tex. App. 2005) (an association may ban satellite dishes
notwithstanding FCC regulations).
146
Id. But see Portola Hills Cmty. Ass’n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580,
583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (striking down a restriction on satellite dishes as
unreasonably obsolete), disapproved of by Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village
Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290 (Cal. 1994) (reasonableness should be
determined facially, not as applied to a particular circumstance).
147
In Bernardo Villas Mgmt. Corp. v. Black, a California court
invalidated a restriction on trucks as unreasonable “as applied to clean,
noncommercial pickup truck used by owners solely for personal
transportation.” 235 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), disapproved of by
Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1290 (reasonableness should be determined facially, not
as applied to a particular circumstance).
148
“Virtually all” CICs ban outdoor clotheslines. Laura Thomas Gebert,
Comment, A Survey of Selected Government-Sponsored Energy Plans and
Recommendations for Florida’s Future Energy Policy, 8 BARRY L. REV. 149,
166 (2007). A typical covenant provides that “[n]o laundry or other clothes
may be hung or displayed outside any Unit.” Mazdabrook Commons
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, No. DC-011532-08, 2010 WL 3517030, at *12
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 1, 2010), aff’d, 46 A.3d 507 (N.J. 2012).
Florida and Utah now have statutes protecting the “right to dry,” but statutory
fixes are recent and exist in a minority of states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
163.04(1)–(2) (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-610 (West 2006). See
also Dusty Horwitt, The Right to Dry Laundry on the Line, LEGAL AFF.,
Jan./Feb. 2004, at 10, 11 (“In California, about seven million people can’t
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however, that changing community opinions and mores is easier
than changing community covenants.
Spotty public participation in community governance, holdouts, and idiosyncratic vocal minorities make the flexibility of the
CIC governance model haphazard. This unpredictable flexibility
means that rules may change in unexpected ways. An association
may enact a completely new restriction, never anticipated by
members when they purchased property in the community.149 For
example, in a 1978 California case, a mother and her two
children were forced out of their home when their association
passed a covenant amendment prohibiting occupancy by anyone
under 18.150 More recently, a smoker who purchased a
hang their clothes in public because of the policies of about 40,000 community
associations.”). For a general discussion of ways that CIC covenants inhibit
green living practices, see Mark A. Pike, Note, Green Building Red-Lighted
by Homeowners’ Associations, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
923, 932–35 (2009).
149
There is a thread of case law that attempts to distinguish between
changes to CIC covenant terms and the addition of new terms, with courts
holding that amendment provisions in an original declaration authorize changes
but not additions. E.g., Lakeland Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Larson, 459 N.E.2d
1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Boyles v. Hausmann, 517 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Neb.
1994). The reasoning in these cases has been criticized as logically flawed. See
Evergreen Highlands Ass’n v. West, 73 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2003). For example,
changing a provision explicitly permitting leasing to explicitly prohibit leasing
would be permitted under the reasoning of Boyles, but adopting a leasing
prohibition would not be permitted if the original declaration was silent as to
an owner’s ability to lease. More recent cases have implicitly overruled or
simply ignored these holdings. See, e.g., Apple II, Condo. Ass’n v. Worth
Bank & Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93 (holding that addition of leasing limitation
was valid without even acknowledging the conflict with the Lakeland
precedent).
150
Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condo. Ass’n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978). Age-based restrictions were not prohibited by statute in 1978,
but a later amendment of the Fair Housing Act created a statutory basis for
striking down such restrictions. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601–19 (2012). The Act, as amended, prohibits discrimination in the sale,
rental, and financing of dwellings, and in other housing-related transactions,
based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status (including
children under the age of 18 living with parents or legal custodians, pregnant
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condominium unit in Colorado likewise did not anticipate that his
association would later amend the declaration to prohibit smoking
in any part of the building, including inside his home.151
By purchasing property in a CIC, an owner is deemed to have
agreed to be bound not just to the terms of the recorded
declaration but also to any changes that a sufficient percentage of
her neighbors may later enact.152 In many cases, the standard for
judicial review of declaration amendments is a variant of the
Business Judgment Rule—changes to owner obligations are
deemed valid as long as the association acted in good faith and
followed procedures enumerated in the governing documents.153
women, and people securing custody of children under the age of 18), and
disability. Id. § 3604.
151
After the judge’s ruling, the homeowner complained to the press that,
“I can’t relax and have a cigarette in my own home.” Ann Schrader, Couple’s
Smoking at Home Snuffed, DENVER POST (Nov. 16, 2006),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_4667551; see also David B. Ezra, “Get

Your Ashes Out of My Living Room!”: Controlling Tobacco Smoke in MultiUnit Residential Housing, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 135, 139 (2001) (exploring the

legal aspects of prohibiting smoking inside condominium units); Staci Semrad,
A New Arena in the Fight Over Smoking: The Home , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2007, at A18 (detailing efforts within condominiums across the country to ban
smoking inside units).
152
While oversight of amendments is minor, judicial review of restrictions
contained in the original declaration is often even more cursory. See Noble v.
Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 270 (Mass. Ct. App. 1993); Brower, supra note 20,
at 242. A complaining owner must prove that an amendment is “unreasonable”
or it will be specifically enforceable. See Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners
Ass’n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1234. (Cal. 2004). Amendments are presumed
enforceable against all owners “unless they are wholly arbitrary, violate a
fundamental public policy, or impose a burden on the use of affected land that
far outweighs any benefit.” Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1287. In some jurisdictions
all amendments and rules properly enacted are clothed with a strong
presumption of validity unless a plaintiff can show bad faith. See Arabian,
supra note 133.
153
A typical approach is uphold any rules and regulations that have been
enacted by the board, acting within the scope of its authority and not abusing
its power or acting arbitrarily and capriciously. Unit Owners Ass’n of
Buildamerica-1 v. Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 378, 386–87 (Va. 1982). This is
essentially the same approach taken in approving corporate decision-making
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Judges reason that by buying into a community, owners in a CIC
have manifested their assent to the terms of the declaration,
including the procedures for amending its terms.154 Courts
conclude that by agreeing to amendment procedures, owners
implicitly agreed to be bound to whatever restrictions a majority
of their neighbors sees fit to impose in the future.155
Because community restrictions are subject to majority-rule
changes, they operate much like a social contract and unlike
servitudes in the absence of an association or built-in amendment
procedure.156 In a very real sense, CIC covenants are really
under the Business Judgment Rule. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). See also supra notes 65–66 and accompanying
text.
154
See, e.g., Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452,
461 (Fla. 2002) (finding that a recorded condominium declaration puts owners
on notice that the restrictions governing the subject properties are “subject to
change through the amendment process” and that owners have thereby agreed
“that they would be bound by properly adopted amendments”); Kroop v.
Caravelle Condo, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(upholding amendment prohibiting leasing because “[p]laintiff acquired title to
her condominium unit with knowledge that the Declaration of Condominium
might thereafter be lawfully amended”); Hill v. Fontaine Condo. Ass’n, 334
S.E.2d 690 (Ga. 1985) (an amendment restricting residence to adults only is
enforceable on all owners); McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain Manor Ass’n, 386
S.E.2d 435, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d, 399 S.E.2d 112 (N.C. 1991)
(holding that an amendment prohibiting leasing “does not infringe upon any
legal right of the plaintiff’s; for she had notice before the units were bought
that the declaration was changeable”).
155
E.g., Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condo. Assn., 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Burgess v. Pelkey, 738 A.2d 783, 787 (D.C. 1999);
Flagler Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Miami v. Crestview Towers Condo. Ass’n,
595 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Breezy Point Holiday Harbor
Lodge-Beechside Apt. Owners’ Ass’n v. B.P. P’ship, 531 N.W.2d 917, 920
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Cape May Harbor Vill. & Yacht Club Ass’n v. Sbrag,
68, 22 A.3d 158, 166 (N.J. App. Div. 2011); Worthinglen Condo. Unit
Owners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio App. 1989). C.f., Breene
v. Plaza Tower Ass’n, 310 N.W.2d 730 (N.D. 1981).
156
Most CC&R amendments require approval by a supermajority of
owners. Changes to rules, however, are made by the board of directors for the
association. This board is elected by majority vote.
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dynamic governing constitutions. The operation of a CIC
therefore raises entity governance issues, such as how decisions
are made, minority voting rights, and limits of governing power.
Group decision-making can be justified by showing that
members of the group enjoy sufficient “voice” (or participation)
and have the ability to “exit” (or leave) if unsatisfied with group
decisions.157 At first blush, the CIC model seems to pose no
problem on these grounds. Every owner has a vote (voice) in
community governance.158 And although owners are bound by
majority-enacted rules, this presents no real liberty concerns as
long as owners can “vote with their feet” and leave if dissatisfied
(exit).159 In the context of corporate governance, exit is the
relatively simple matter of selling one’s stock. But CIC
membership is bundled with homeownership and the only way to
exit is to sell one’s home and move. This makes exit from a CIC
tremendously burdensome. Real property is quite illiquid; it may
take quite some time to find a buyer. In addition, it is personally
and psychologically disruptive to relocate or divest one’s
homeownership.160 Therefore, although exit is available in theory,
market and psychological realities create a practical barrier to exit
in CICs.
In some cases, restrictive covenants create legal barriers to
157

The terms “voice” and “exit” are borrowed from the corporate
governance classic, ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY
(1970).
158
Brower, supra note 20, at 245 (noting that “[p]articipatory consent
substitutes democratic decision-making and consensus building for state
regulation over substantive terms”).
159
Id. at 242 (explaining the argument that assent exists even for
amendments because dissatisfied owner members in a CIC are always free to
leave the community if they disagree with its rules).
160
Id. at 224 (referring to the “financial and psychological stakes raised”
by requiring a home sale to exit). Much of the impetus behind defaulting
mortgagor rescue efforts has been the individual harms from forced home
sales. See Julia Patterson Forrester & Jerome Michael Organ, Promising to Be

Prudent: A Private Law Approach to Mortgage Loan Regulation in CommonInterest Communities, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 739, 739 (2012) (calling a
forced sale of a home “clearly devastating to the homeowner”).
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CIC exit as well, by limiting an owner’s ability to sell or lease
her property. Some CIC covenants may provide that property
transfers can occur only with association consent.161 Others may
grant the association a first right of refusal with respect to any
proposed transfer.162 Restrictions on who can occupy a unit and
prohibitions on leasing of a unit are even more common. 163 When
restrictions constrain an owner’s ability to exit a CIC regime, it
no longer is valid to say that continued membership or occupancy
in the private community is truly voluntary and necessarily
manifests a continuing desire to be bound by the governance
E.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass’n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
162
E.g., Lakeside Manor Condo. Ass’n v. Forehand, 513 So. 2d 1104
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Wolinsky v. Kadison, 449 N.E.2d 151, 155 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983); Anderson v. 50 E. 72nd St. Condo., 505 N.Y.S.2d 101
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1986), appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y.
1987).
163
Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation Restraints, supra note 33.
Although limitations on occupancy based on race now are illegal and
ineffective, for decades racial segregation was upheld as an acceptable way to
promote the accepted policy goals of high property values and social harmony.
HARRY GRANT ATKINSON & L.E. FRAILEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF REAL ESTATE
PRACTICE 428–29 (1946); BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 34; MCKENZIE supra
note 29, at 60–68; ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 231 (1948).
Prior to the 1988 amendment of the Fair Housing Act, many CICs contained
occupancy restrictions that prohibited residence by children. See, e.g., Ritchey
v. Villa Nueva Condo. Ass’n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978);
Everglades Plaza Condo. Ass’n v. Buckner, 462 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); Hill v. Fontaine Condo. Ass’n, 334 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. 1985).
The most common occupancy restraint and alienability restraint in CIC
covenants today is a restriction on occupancy by non-owner tenants. Katharine
N. Rosenberry, Home Businesses, Llamas and Aluminum Siding: Trends in
Covenant Enforcement, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 443, 461–66 (1998); see
also, e.g., Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass’n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223,
1234 (Cal. 2004); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275
(Cal. 1994); White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla.
1979); Flagler Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Miami v. Crestview Towers Condo.
Ass’n, 595 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); McElveen-Hunter v.
Fountain Manor Ass’n, 386 S.E.2d 435 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d, 399
S.E.2d 112 (N.C. 1991); see also Rawling, supra note 19, at 225.
161
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regime. This calls into question the continuing legitimacy of the
CIC social contract.

D. Covenant Drafting: Authors and Influences
CIC “agreements” consist of non-negotiable covenants that
have already been drafted and recorded by the developer to create
a binding servitude on the land before homes are ever sold.164
This not only informs the reality of homeowner choice, it also
reveals that none of the community residents actually authors the
covenants that bind the community. Who, then, dictates these
adhesive provisions?
At first blush, the answer seems to be that it is the developer
who drafts the governing documents, forms the CIC association,
and records the declaration, but the reality is more complicated.165
Some market theorists claim that the unilateral act of a developer
in designing CIC covenants is not troubling because in choosing
to create a CIC and in crafting the content of community CC&Rs,
See MCKENZIE, supra note 29, at 127; supra Part I.B. Prior
recordation is required to legally sell a condominium unit and is prudent in
order to create a binding servitude on subsequent property owners. HYATT,
supra note 4; Winokur, supra note 105. Some early CICs were established
from existing neighborhoods, and in such cases, homeowners did theoretically
have some input into a declaration’s content. MCKENZIE, supra note 29, at 33–
36.
165
See generally WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUMS AND HOME OWNERS
ASSOCIATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (1985) (explaining
the developer’s process of creating a CIC and explaining how home buyers are
recipients of, rather than shapers of, the initial servitude regime). In a section
titled “Developer-Appointed Boards Should Actively Lead the Owners,” Hyatt
notes: “[M]ost people, by obvious logic, are followers in most aspects of their
lives—some in virtually all respects. Social order would not be obtained
without that condition.” See also MCKENZIE supra note 29 at 21, 127
(describing the developer’s role in establishing CC&Rs and bemoaning lack of
resident input into the governing terms); Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at
1127–30 (“CIC residents play no direct role in the critical decision-making
process leading to the organization of the CIC.”); Winokur, supra note 105, at
58–60 (explaining the complete lack of homeowner input with respect to the
content of CIC covenants).
164
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the developer takes into account consumer preferences as a way
to maximize sale price.166 This makes sense in theory, but in
reality, this has never been completely true. Instead, as a
condition of zoning approval, local municipalities often require
that a new development be organized as a common interest
community, and this factor drives CIC creation perhaps more
than anything else. Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(each a “Government Sponsored Enterprise” or “GSE”),167 and
the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) indirectly
determine the content of CIC covenants through their mortgage
finance underwriting guidelines.168 Because of the influence of
these government actors, CIC covenants have become
standardized in the industry and may fail to represent developer
marketing strategy or consumer preferences.169
The vast majority of mortgage loans made today are insured
by the FHA or earmarked for resale to Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac.170 The GSEs were at one time private entities but have
Forrester & Organ, supra note 160, at 744–45.
Fannie Mae (formerly the Federal National Mortgage Association) and
Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) were chartered
by Congress and regulated by federal agencies and since 2008 have been in
conservatorship with the federal government. See Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable
166
167

Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and Control of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1499–1502 (2011) [hereinafter
Boyack, Laudable Goals] (giving an overview of the market role and
enumerated purposes of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
168
See Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2.
169
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50; Steven Siegel, The Public Role in

Establishing Private Residential Communities: Towards A New Formulation of
Local Government Land Use Policies That Eliminates the Legal Requirements
to Privatize New Communities in the United States, 38 URB. LAW. 859, 873–
98 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, The Public Role]; see also DILGER, supra note

106, at 38 (explaining that CICs are “increasingly offering fairly uniform
levels and types of services.”).
170
See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A RESPONSIBLE MARKET FOR HOUSING
FINANCE: A PROGRESS PLAN TO REFORM THE U.S. SECONDARY MARKET FOR
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES (2011), available at http://www.american
progress.org/issues/2011/01/pdf/responsiblemarketforhousingfinance.pdf; see
also Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 82–84, 105–06
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always been heavily regulated at the federal level and were
established with an implicit (later explicit) government
guaranty.171 They exist in order to promote homeownership.172
But historically and today, the GSEs do more than funnel money
into the residential mortgage market: through approval
requirements and form documents, the GSEs and the FHA dictate
the terms of housing arrangements at every level.173
In order to qualify for resale to one of the GSEs, a mortgage
must be secured by an acceptable property. In the CIC context,
that generally means that the community in which the property is
located must meet GSE underwriting mandates.174 The
Department of Housing and Urban Development maintains a list
of “Approved Condominium Projects,” and typically Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac will only purchase mortgages on units in
condominiums that are on the approved list.175
(noting that the GSEs and FHA are involved in most new mortgages); Jody
Shenn & John Gittelsohn, FHA Home-Loan Volume is Sign of “Very Sick
System,” Agency’s Stevens Says, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2010), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-24/fha-home-loan-volume-is-sign-of-very-sicksystem-agency-s-stevens-says.html (stating that the FHA and GSEs have been
financing 90% of home lending since the 2008 market collapse).
171
See Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 167, at 1491; David Reiss,

The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019,

1022 (2008).
172
Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 167, at 1495.
173
In crafting CIC declarations, developers lift language directly from
government forms and model documents and mirror precisely GSE and FHA
underwriting requirements. Winokur, supra note 105, at 59.
174
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prohibit any ownership
concentration in condominiums, meaning that if one owner holds title to 10%
or more of the units, no unit in the CIC may secure a GSE mortgage.
Additional requirements include required community majority owner
occupancy for loans to owner-investors, at least 10% of the association’s
budget earmarked to fund reserves, and no more than 15% of the members
being delinquent on paying their assessments. FREDDIE MAC CONDOMINIUM
UNIT MORTGAGES (July 2013, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/
learn/pdfs/uw/condo.pdf; EFANNIEMAE SEC INSTRUMENTS (2014), available
at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/secinstruments.
175
See Mortgagee Letter 2009-19 from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant
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Communities with a high percentage of non-owner-occupied
units or a high percentage of members in default on assessment
payments will not appear on the approved lists and thus will
likely not qualify for GSE mortgage funds.176 The precise
threshold percentages vary from time to time, and precise
mandates of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may differ, but the
GSEs typically preclude mortgage loans secured by properties in
CICs where more than 15% of the owners are delinquent in their
assessments or where more than 50% of units are non-owneroccupied.177 This latter provision justifies community restrictions
on leasing. Because of the community owner occupancy
requirement, standard form declarations provide for various
levels of control over an owner’s ability to lease, ranging from
complete or near-complete prohibition of leasing to nearly
ubiquitous (and GSE/FHA-mandated) restrictions on short-term
rentals.178 In some contexts it is tricky to comply with both GSE
owner occupancy standards and the mandates of the FHA,
Sec’y for Hous. Fed. Hous. Comm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to
All Approved Mortgagees & All FHA Roster Appraisers 1 (June 12, 2009),
available at http://www.bestfhalender.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/0919ml.pdf; Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B from David H. Stevens, Assistant Sec’y
for Hous. Fed. Hous. Comm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All
Approved Mortgagees and All FHA Roster Appraisers 1 (Nov. 6, 2009),
available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/
09-46bml.pdf.
176
Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 105–06.
177
Until recently, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would not purchase
mortgages secured by property in CICs with a high percentage of non-owneroccupied units. FREDDIE MAC, CONDOMINIUM UNIT MORTGAGES 3 (2013),
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/condo.pdf; Mortgagee
Letter 2012-18 from Carol J. Galante, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Hous. Fed.
Hous. Comm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All Approved
Mortgagees & All FHA Roster Appraisers 6–10 (Sep. 13, 2012), available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=12-18ml.pdf. Recently,
the underwriting requirements with respect to community owner-occupancy
have been softened for purchasers intending to become owner occupants
themselves. Nevertheless, for decades, CIC owner-occupancy levels have been
factors in mortgage funding decisions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
178
See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text.
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however. The FHA views a complete ban on leasing as an
unlawful restraint on alienation, but the GSEs require high
community owner occupancy rates. Because of this, conventional
wisdom in crafting CIC declarations is to prohibit most—but not
all—units from being leased.179 This allows a CIC to walk the line
between running afoul of the FHA rules and disqualifying the
community from GSE investment.
Complying with the underwriting requirements of Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA can make or break a CIC
project. Properties in qualifying communities have access to
vastly more mortgage capital, and liquidity bolsters property
values. Conversely, property in a community with too many
tenants or too many assessment-delinquent owners will be cut off
from mortgage funds, decreasing the property’s liquidity and
market price and perhaps even rendering the property
unsellable.180 Developers across the nation want their products
sold for the highest prices and therefore need their would-be
buyers to have access to the requisite funds. This requires that the
developers will frame the CC&Rs to match the guidelines of the
GSEs and the FHA whenever possible.181
See, e.g., ELIA B. GILBERT, FHA CONDOMINIUM CERTIFICATIONS:
THE REQUIREMENTS AND THE PROHIBITIONS, available at http://www.
hindmansanchez.com/sites/default/files/resources/FHA%20Condominium
%20Certifications%20The%20Requirements%20and%20Prohibitions.pdf;
Matt McMullin, FHA Approval and Rental Restrictions—A Curious
Relationship, VIAL FOTHERINGHAM LLP (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.vflaw.com/articles/fha-information; Jim Slaughter, FHA Guidelines &
Condominium Rental Restrictions, ROSSABI BLACK SLAUGHTER, PA (Mar. 1,
2013), http://www.lawfirmrbs.com/blog/fha-guidelines-condominium-rentalrestrictions/. It is literally possible to satisfy both GSE and FHA requirements
of CIC covenants provided that only one unit may be rented at any time.
180
This sets up a strange dichotomy: in communities with no-leasing
covenants, owners cannot legally rent, but in communities without such
covenants, too many neighborhood rentals will make it practically impossible
for an owner to sell. The existence of GSE guidelines on owner occupancy
thus necessarily restricts (practically if not legally) the owners’ ability to
transfer. For a more detailed discussion of this conundrum, see Boyack,
Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2.
181
See Winokur, supra note 105, at 59.
179

2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX

5/19/2014 11:27 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

818

Because meeting FHA and GSE requirements is so vital to
community success, changes to entity and agency policies can
rapidly and effectively impact covenant content for future CICs.
One such example is how new policies of the GSEs and FHA
rapidly changed the use of private transfer fees (PTF) covenants
in CC&Rs. Over the past decade, many developers started
including PTF covenants in CC&Rs as a way to defer and
privatize payment of today’s development costs.182 PTF covenants
require that a fee equal to a percentage of the sale price be paid
either to the association or to a designated third party as a
condition of property resale.183 More than eleven million homes
are currently encumbered by PTF covenants.184
Innovators of such PTF covenants claim that these covenants
keep housing affordable by temporally spreading the ballooning
costs of development.185 Mimicking the traditional freedom of
182

For example, between 2001 and 2006, Lennar Corporation included
PTF covenants into CC&Rs governing 13,000 homes in California. These
PTFs are payable to the Lennar Charitable Housing Foundation. See Robbie
Wheelan, Home-Resale Fees Under Attack, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487033149045753992905
11802382. In New York, Freehold Partners crafted a creative solution to
building costs by entering into agreements with developers to buy the right to
collect PTFs in exchange for upfront development fees. Freehold then
securitized the obligations by pooling and selling shares in the aggregate
income stream from PTFs. Id. (“Municipalities have long used similar fees,
called transfer taxes, to raise revenues or recoup public subsidies for private
development projects, but private transfer fees are relatively new.”). For an
excellent and thorough discussion of PTFs, see R. Wilson Freyermuth, Private
Transfer Fee Covenants: Cleaning Up the Mess, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST.
L.J. 419 (2010).
183
Freyermuth supra note 182; see also Richard Mansfield, Private
Transfer Fee Covenants: A Thing of the Past?, WORLDWIDE ERC
(Feb. 7, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www.worldwideerc.org/Blogs/Mobility
LawBlog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=c020aee5%2D48ad%2D47b2%2D8295
%2Da4cf71ba9e34&ID=57 (explaining how PTFs work and when they came
into use).
184
Burke T. Ward & Jamie P. Hopkins, Private Transfer Fees: Developer
Exploitation or Legitimate Financing Vehicle?, 56 VILL. L. REV. 901, 901
(2012).
185
See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, LEARN HOW CAPITAL
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contract rationale in CIC oversight cases, PTF proponents argue
that PTF covenants are not unfair because buyers in CICs, by the
very act of purchasing the property in the first place, have agreed
to pay these resale fees in the future.186 But many buyers, policy
makers, and legislatures objected to an imposition of a long-term
private tax on transfers of property, particularly when the
proceeds of such fees went to private investors.187 At least thirtysix states responded to the advent of PTFs by passing laws
limiting their validity,188 typically channeling PTF proceeds to
community associations and prohibiting payment of PTFs to
private for-profit third parties.189
It is recognized that state governments can pass statutes to
directly prohibit certain types of covenant restrictions. The
federal government’s ability to control the content of CIC
RECOVERY FEE INSTRUMENTS CAN HELP YOU, available at
http://www.freeholdcapitalpartners.com/forms/freehold_brochure.pdf
[hereinafter FREEHOLD CAPITAL].
186
The act supposedly manifesting assent to the PTF covenants included
in recorded CC&Rs was the home purchase. Ward & Hopkins, supra note
184, at 902; see also Freyermuth, supra note 182 (explaining the problematic
aspects of inferring consent in this way). One law review article considering
the issue of PTF covenants contends that buyers would simply decrease their
offer price when purchasing property burdened by PTF covenants in
recognition of their obligation to pay in the future, but there is no indication
that buyers actually do this. Ward & Hopkins, supra note 184, at 913–16
(arguing that every buyer “willingly agrees to buy the property knowing, at
least constructively, about the existence of the PTF” and can adjust their price
accordingly (emphasis added)). The authors advocate for a stronger disclosure
approach to PTF enforceability. Id.
187
Id. The Coalition to Stop Home Resale Fees asserted that PTFs are
“Wall Street lining their pockets while stealing equity from homeowners.”
Wheelan, supra note 182. Most PTFs are not designed to exist in perpetuity,
but rather provide an expiration date, typically 99 years. Mansfield, supra note
183; Ward & Hopkins supra note 184.
188
By 2011, 36 states had passed some limiting legislation with respect to
PTFs. Ward & Hopkins, supra note 184, at 902.
189
Only a handful of regulating states prohibit PTFs. Most of the
legislative focus has been on to whom the fees are paid, not whether the fees
are payable. Id. California’s statutory fix permits all types of PTFs but
mandates special disclosures. Mansfield, supra note 183.

2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX

5/19/2014 11:27 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

820

covenants, however, is less obvious. No federal agency has the
authority to ban certain types of covenants from CIC
declarations, but the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)190
can achieve this indirectly. The FHFA controls the actions of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The FHFA regulates the GSEs,
and GSE underwriting requirements drive CIC structuring. When
the FHFA tells the GSE to refrain from purchasing mortgages
secured by property burdened by certain types of restrictions, it
indirectly—but tremendously effectively—mandates the content of
CIC covenants.191 In March 2012, the FHFA published a rule
prohibiting Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home
Loan Banks from purchasing mortgages on properties
encumbered by PTFs payable to third parties.192 This FHFA
regulation has been tremendously effective, virtually wiping out
privately directed PTF covenants in CICs formed after March
190

The FHFA was created by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008. See Pub. L. No.110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 15, 26, 37, 38, and 42 U.S.C.A.). The primary
purpose of FHFA is to regulate Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal
Home Loan Banks.
191
One commentator opined that the FHFA regulation “virtually
guarantees that [PTFs] will be used no more.” Bobby Saadieh, FHFA’s Final
Ruling Will Restrict Private Transfer Fees, PERTRIA (Apr. 12, 2012, 11:04
AM),
http://www.pertria.com/2012/fhfas-final-ruling-will-restrict-privatetransfer-fees-2/.
192
FHFA Restrictions, 12 C.F.R. § 1228 (2012). The FHFA rule does
not address PTFs payable to a community association. The FHFA rule also
excludes PTFs paid to certain tax-exempt organizations that use the PTF
proceeds to benefit the property, but includes any fees not allocated to property
improvement and upkeep. Id. The rule also applies only prospectively (from its
announcement in 2011), and thus impacts CIC declarations recorded after that
time, but not any of the previously recorded CC&Rs that included PTF
provisions. Id.; see also Mansfield, supra note 183 (explaining that this rule
will not affect the thousands of existing mortgages for deeds containing a PTF
covenant). For further discussion of the FHFA rule, see Announcement SEL2012-05, SELLING GUIDE (Fannie Mae, Washington, D.C.), June 19, 2012, at
1,
available
at
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/
sel1205.pdf. Freehold Capital, however, estimates that over $600 billion worth
of PTF securities are currently in commerce. FREEHOLD CAPITAL, supra note
185.
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2012. This example provides an interesting glimpse into how
federal agency action can directly impact the content of “private”
CC&Rs.
Locally, municipalities can also impact covenant communities
by requiring a CIC structure in exchange for granting zoning
approval for new projects.193 Since zoning approval is a
prerequisite to creating a new community, local regulators’
preferences, with respect to the existence and content of CC&Rs,
are incorporated whenever possible. In mandating covenant
substance, many municipalities adhere to the FHA guidelines
with respect to CIC structuring.194 Financial realities motivate
municipal requirements as well. Local governments have long
realized that the CIC ownership structure can be used as a vehicle
for privatizing traditional municipal functions.195 The greater the
percentage of community amenities and upkeep that can be
channeled to private community maintenance, the better for the
municipal budget.
These external influences on the content of CIC covenants is
obscured by continued judicial assertions that such covenants
represent the private contractual choices of the residents in a
given community.196 In reality, covenant terms do not necessarily
See Siegel, The Public Role, supra note 169, at 877–95 (calling the
CIC ownership concept as “a form of ‘grand bargain’ between developers and
municipalities” and citing to several local zoning statutes that require use of
the CIC form).
194
The FHA prescribes numerous “initial” terms for CC&Rs and also
strongly advocates the imposition of supermajority requirements to amend CIC
governing documents. Such supermajority requirements attempt to promote
predictability preferred by FHA insurers and “prevent owners from banding
together.” MCKENZIE, supra note 29, at 127. These “recommendations” are
backed with the possibility of FHA mortgage insurance and have been widely
followed. Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1114.
195
TREESE ET AL., supra note 42, at 3; Boyack, Community Collateral
Damage, supra note 2, at 60; Siegel, The Public Role, supra note 169, at 879.
196
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1112 (the “CIC phenomenon is,
increasingly, the direct product of conscious and deliberate government policy
. . . .”). The CIC covenant situation is an example of an adhesion contract
drafted by neither party to the transaction, “where the terms are proffered by a
third party and both contracting parties are reduced to the humble role of
193
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represent homeowner will in any real sense.197 Rather, CIC
covenants are more likely to reflect the extent to which a
developer acquiesces to municipal requirements and follows FHA
and GSE underwriting “guidance.”198
III. A LEGAL-HYBRID APPROACH TO CICS

A. Refocusing Freedom of Contract Policy
CIC covenants are legal hybrids, not contracts. Servitude law
determines their duration and enforceability, and their functions
approximate association governance or even, to some extent,
public local governments. Because CIC covenants are real
property servitudes that create dynamic private community
governance systems—not mere contracts—contract law should not
create a basically un-rebuttable presumption of validity.199 The
adherent.” Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the
Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 346 (2011).
197
To the contrary, numerous studies have shown that homeowners are
dissatisfied with the content of their community covenants and, as a general
rule, the provisions of CC&Rs diverge markedly from community preferences.
Winokur, supra note 105, at 63 n.260–61; see also STEPHEN E. BARTON &
CAROL J. SILVERMAN, CAL. DEP’T OF REAL ESTATE, COMMON INTEREST
HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS MANAGEMENT STUDY (1987). A report
published by the Urban Land Institute found that a majority of residents in
CICs were greatly dissatisfied with their community. CAROL NORCROSS,
TOWNHOUSES & CONDOMINIUMS: RESIDENTS’ LIKES AND DISLIKES 80 (1973).
The report characterized residents as “unhappy, resentful, discouraged, and
disillusioned about their associations,” with “[a] considerable number of
families . . . so angry that they are selling their homes and moving away . . .
to get away from what they think of as strait-jacket controls on their lives.” Id.
198
NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR.,. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING
LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 49.2 (rev. ed. 2013) (explaining
that in a CIC, “the actual decisions on land use and building forms in the
district, and perhaps also on density, are explicitly to be made, not by a
general public policy adopted in advance, but by negotiation between the
municipality and the developer”); Siegel, The Public Role, supra note 169, at
879–80.
199
Contracts voluntarily entered into should be enforceable
notwithstanding unfairness created by their terms. Economic and liberty theory
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economic justifications for presumptive enforcement of contracts
voluntarily entered into do not always apply to CIC covenants.
Unlike voluntary contracts, CIC covenants are not necessarily
freely chosen by owners who voluntarily elect to be bound by
their terms. Autonomy and efficiency policy goals, therefore, are
not necessarily promoted by CIC covenant enforcement.
Promoting the underlying values that freedom of contract
represents should inform the decision of whether to enforce CIC
governing acts, but CIC covenants and regulations should not be
upheld simply based on the rhetoric of freedom of contract as an
end in and of itself. At a minimum, an owner’s overt act
specifically manifesting assent should be prerequisite to being
bound to the provisions of community CC&Rs. In addition,
unlike contracts, courts and legislators should protect the public
interest by limiting CIC governance’s permissible subject matter
and scope. To summarily validate private community regulations
as if they were mere contract provisions does not necessarily
promote the values of autonomy and efficiency. To the contrary,
in some cases, it threatens these same values.
Freedom to voluntarily obligate oneself in contract to terms of
one’s choice is a paramount and protected legal right allocated to
capable parties in our society.200 Each person with this freedom to
justifies this result. Treating CIC covenants as if they were contracts freely
chosen by the members who are bound by their terms, however, does not
necessarily promote autonomy and efficiency.
200
Courts in Ohio, for example, have called freedom of contract
“fundamental to our society.” Royal Indem. Co. v. Baker Protective Servs.,
Inc., 515 N.E.2d 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted). Freedom of
contract is a constitutionally protected liberty right. Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). U.S. case law is replete with citations to freedom
of contract as a primary public policy underlying the law. See, e.g., Venegas
v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87 (1990) (requiring, and not finding, specific
direction by Congress to limit freedom of contract); Chambers Dev. Co. v.
Passaic Cnty. Utilities Auth., 62 F.3d 582, 589 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The sanctity
of a contract is a fundamental concept of our entire legal structure. Freedom of
contract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain.”); City & Cnty. of
Denver v. The Dist. Court of Denver, 939 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Colo. 1997)
(“The right of parties to contract freely is well developed in our
jurisprudence.”); DeVetter v. Principal Mutual Life Ins., 516 N.W.2d 792,
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contract has the power to be his or her own legislature and create
binding obligations that will be enforced by the court.201 Freedom
of contract is a universal concept, a key characteristic of almost
every legal system.202 The principle that agreements are binding is
the cornerstone of international law203 and one of the fundamental
precepts in our political philosophy.204
Freedom of contract theory requires voluntary assent, and
enforcement of private agreements is predicated on personal
autonomy both with respect to choosing to be bound in obligation
794 (Iowa 1994) (opining that freedom to contract is a “weighty societal
interest”); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan. 1996) (“The paramount
public policy is that freedom to contract is not to be interfered with lightly.”)
(citation omitted).
201
See, e.g., RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF
CONTRACT LAW (2012); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT
LAW (1997); Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1990); Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The
Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70
IOWA L. REV. 769, 825 (1985).
202
All common law jurisdictions have cases that reiterate the primacy of
the principle of freedom of contract. See, e.g., News Ltd. v. Austl. Rugby
Football League Ltd. (1996) 135 ALR 33 (Austl.) (explaining judicial
hesitancy to “interfere with the general freedom of contract under the law”).
Freedom of contract is a foundational piece of European contract law and the
contract jurisprudence of all EU Member States of the European Union. See
THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, art. 1:102 (2002).
203
The Justinian Code made much of pacta sunt servanda (the concept that
agreements are binding). K.M. Sharma, From “Sanctity” to “Fairness”: An
Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 95, 97 (1999); see also United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (1988)
(setting forth the general principles for international transactions); I.I.
Lukashuk, The Principle Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Nature of Obligation
Under International Law, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 513 (1989) (explaining the
principle that treaty obligations must be fulfilled as a baseline concept in
international law).
204
Western capitalist countries, especially the United States, adhere more
strongly to freedom of contract principles in their purest, least constrained
form. See P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 10
(1985).
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and with respect to choosing the parameters of that obligation.205
Freedom of contract meshes well with American primacy of
personal freedom and capitalist economic theory of market selfregulation that considers each contracting party the best judge of
his or her own interests.206 In addition, many commentators
believe that allowing individuals the power to contract as they
choose, substantially free from regulatory interference or
oversight, advances liberty interests.207 Economic theory also
posits that optimal efficiency results when individuals may
contract freely,208 and that judicial protection of the future
See REINHARD ZIMMERMAN, THE NEW GERMAN LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 205 (2005)
(“[F]reedom of contract is not an end in itself. Rather, it must be regarded as a
means of promoting the self-determination of those who wish to conclude a
contract.”).
206
See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner, eds., 1982); see also
G.H. TREITEL, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 3–5 (6th ed. 2005)
(“[L]aissez-faire” economic theory advises that government “do nothing, and
let the market resolve any problem that arises.”).
207
Richard Epstein calls freedom of contract an essential aspect of
individual liberty, guaranteeing “to individuals a sphere of influence in which
they will be able to operate, without having to justify themselves to the state or
to third parties.” Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical
Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293–94 (1975) [hereinafter Epstein,
Unconscionability]. According to theories of autonomy and individual will, it
is empowering to grant contracting parties quasi-legislative powers inter se.
See, e.g., BRIAN A. BLUM, CONTRACTS § 1.4.1 (6th ed. 2013) (“The power to
enter contracts and to formulate the terms of the contractual relationship is . . .
an integral part of personal liberty.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of
Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576
(1969) (drawing parallels between legislation and contract).
208
See FREDERICH A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS 91–92, 96–105 (1978); POSNER, supra note 100, at 48–49.
Although widely accepted throughout the twentieth century, the efficient
market hypothesis has come under fire during the most recent financial crisis,
with some theorists blaming free markets for creating the real estate bubble
that sparked a global financial meltdown in 2008. Other theorists opine that it
was the interference with the free market that created systemic volatility. For a
brief overview of these competing viewpoints, see David Shay Corbett II, Free
205
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expectations created by contracts increases societal wealth.209
Even though freedom of a contract is an aspect of personal
liberty, all contract enforceability presents a temporal autonomy
paradox. An individual who exercises her freedom of contract
today binds her future self, necessarily limiting her later
freedom.210 Future freedom limitations are only justified because
they are voluntarily chosen. Protections against involuntary
contracting ensure that a party’s freedom is only restricted to the
extent that she so chooses.211 Furthermore, the policy of allowing
contractual non-performance in exchange for payment of
compensatory damages ameliorates concerns about limitations of
one’s future freedom.212 Efficiency policy supports the contract
damages approach as well, justifying not only a party’s freedom
Markets and Government Regulation: The Competing Views of Thomas
Woods and George Cooper, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 547 (2010).
209

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA STUDY 10,
22–23 (2011). Wealth maximization through contract enforcement is a
foundational concept in the law. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE
MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 157 (2000) (“Law is the instrument that fixes and
realizes capital.”); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 553, 562–63 (1933) (“[A] regime in which contracts are freely made and
generally enforced gives greater scope to individual initiative and thus
promotes the greatest wealth of a nation.”).
210
See Winokur, supra note 105, at 50 (explaining this concept in terms
of Ulysses tying himself to his ship’s mast, deliberately robbing his future self
of the freedom to react to the sirens’ song).
211
For example, the doctrines of duress, undue influence,
unconscionability, incapacity, and fraud all protect a contracting party from
involuntarily limiting her future freedom of action.
212
Courts generally award expectation damages for a breach of contract
equal to the economic difference between what the non-breaching party
expected to obtain from the breaching party’s performance and what actually
was obtained (plus foreseeable costs resulting from the breach and less any
cost savings from avoiding reciprocal performance and from mitigation). The
theory behind expectation damages has been explained as best approximating
the value of both retrospective and prospective reliance and as the economic
equivalent of the bargained-for interest of the contracting parties. See David
W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in Contract Damages, 48 EMORY L.J.
1137, 1139 (1999); L. L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages (Pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 57–62 (1936).
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to enter a contract but also her freedom to breach the contract
upon paying the non-breaching party’s expectation interest.213
Freedom to breach a contract and pay damages is a widely touted
American innovation that supports the dual values of efficiency
and personal liberty, and mitigates the temporal autonomy
paradox of contract law.214 Although continuing to be obligated to
the financial effect of a contract, contracting parties typically can
use breach to exit the contracting relationship.215 The voluntary
manifestation of assent requirement coupled with contract law’s
approach to damages adequately ensures both freedom and
efficiency in a typical contract context.
The same values that underlie freedom of contract theory can
only justify the enforcement of CIC covenants if there is a higher
threshold of true assent. Because CIC covenant terms are more
durable than contracts and are specifically enforceable, the
possibility of breach and the passage of time do not ameliorate
their effect. Actual informed assent is therefore even more vital
213

In the late nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes posited that
breach of contract is viewed by the law as “amoral,” and is essentially an
option purchased through payment of expectation damages. Holmes, supra
note 118, at 462. Theorists of the law and economics school have seized upon
this concept and expanded it into the theory of efficient breach, holding that “it
is uneconomical to induce completion of performance of a contract after it has
been broken” and explaining that the law should encourage (or at least not
discourage) any breach that is “efficient.” POSNER, supra note 100, at 149–51.
214
The default remedy in contract breach actions in the United States is a
monetary award of expectation damages, but under civil law, breach of
contract is typically remedied by an order of specific performance rather than a
monetary calculation of damages. See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v.
Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1068 (2003) (“[T]he civil law grants specific performance in breach of
contract cases as a matter of course.”).
215
Breach as a tool for flexibility justifies other aspects of contract law
such as judicial reluctance to excuse an obligation based on changed
circumstances, judicial scrutiny of penalizing liquidated damages provisions,
and judicial reluctance to order specific performance. See John D. Wladis,

Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of
Impossibility of Performance in English Common Law , 75 GEO. L.J. 1575
(1987).
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in the context of private community covenants.216 In addition,
because the key act of assent drives obligation under the dynamic
governing process, and because individual opt-out is not possible
in a CIC (absent sale of the home), the law should require that
the amendment and rulemaking processes be specifically known
by and explicitly agreed to by owners from the start.217 This can
be accomplished through (a) requiring homeowners to
demonstrate a separate manifestation of intent to be bound by the
CIC, apart from the mere purchase of a parcel of real property
located in a given community, and (b) through mandating a more
effective (earlier, more accessible) disclosure of community
covenants and rules.218
Public policy restraints in contract law also offer some ideas
about how to deal with covenants and rules that impact other
important social policies. While courts generally uphold contracts
regardless of their content, there is some degree of judicial
suspicion with respect to certain contractual provisions such as
limitations on a party’s autonomy with respect to future
contracting or future breach, limits on free trade, and barriers to
free alienation.219 For example, although parties might agree
today that no modification to a contract will be binding unless
See Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO.
L.J. 697 (2010) (discussing incomplete consumer notice and barriers to
effective modification in CICs).
217
For a discussion of how property purchase is deemed assent to current
as well as future terms of community governing documents and association
acts, see supra notes 50–93, 164–73, and accompanying text.
218
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has been pioneering efforts
to increase the effectiveness of consumer disclosures in the context of
mortgage lending. A similar effort should drive qualitative improvements of
CIC disclosures to homebuyers.
219
While some contracts are deemed unenforceable on substantive public
policy grounds, this is a rather exceptional result. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 5.1 (4th ed. 2004); see also Swaverly v. Freeway Ford Truck Sales, 700
N.E.2d 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding that public policy strongly favors
freedom to contract and enforcement should only be avoided if a contract
clearly contravenes articulated public policy).
216
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that agreement is evidenced by a signed writing, if parties later
agree to orally modify the contract, the later oral modification
will still be enforced at common law.220 In spite of the general
hands-off approach to the subject matter of contracts, courts do
police contractual promises not to compete based on public policy
concerns regarding market freedom and an individual’s right to
earn a livelihood.221 Contractual promises designed to have the in
terrorem effect of discouraging breach, in the form of penalizing
liquidated damages clauses, are likewise subject to judicial
restraint and invalidation.222 And limitations on property
alienability have been legally suspect for hundreds of years.223
See, e.g., Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1173 (D. Or. 2010); Truhe v. Turnac Grp. L.L.C., 599 N.W.2d 378,
383 (S.D. 1999). Statutory provisions have modified this general rule, and the
Uniform Commercial Code specifically departs from the common law in
making no oral modification clauses presumptively enforceable. U.C.C. § 2209(2) (2012).
221
Historically, covenants not to compete were held to be invalid
restraints on trade. See Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277,
1281 (Ariz. 1999). Courts will, however, enforce non-compete provisions that
are determined to be reasonable in scope. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Companies,
Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Ohio Urology, Inc.
v. Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1031–32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
222
See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated
220

Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an
Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
554 (1977).

See Michael D. Kirby, Comment, Restraints on Alienation: Placing A
13th Century Doctrine in 21st Century Perspective, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 413,
223

413 (1988) (“Without doubt, the concept of free alienability is a cornerstone of
modern Anglo-American civilization . . . .”); Merrill I. Schnebly, Restraints
Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: I, 44 YALE L.J. 961, 961 (1935)
(“Since an early date in the history of the English common law, it has been
thought socially and economically desirable that the owner of a present fee
simple in land, or of a corresponding absolute interest in chattels, should have
the power to transfer his interest.”). The Restatement (Second) of Property
asserts that “[m]uch of modern property law operates on the assumption that
freedom to alienate property interests which one may own is essential to the
welfare of society.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP., DONATIVE
TRANSFERS PART II, Introductory Note (1981); see also RESTATEMENT
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Correctly interpreting and applying public policy constraints on
CIC covenants is vital to ensuring the proper scope and role of
private community governing rules.
Another issue involving CIC covenants is their presumptive
specific enforceability. Specifically enforcing covenants
regardless of their impact on community preferences and their
economic costs is an unwarranted dilution of owners’ and, in
some cases, non-owners’ liberty.224 Only in cases where parties
have actually and voluntarily agreed to provisions that restrain
important freedoms should courts specifically enforce these sorts
of covenants. Over-reliance on the form of freedom of contract
without requiring actual assent undermines both autonomy and
efficiency—the very social values that freedom of contract is
designed to promote.225
There has been much scholarship endorsing a hands-off
judicial enforcement of CIC covenants based on the wholesale
application of freedom of contract theory.226 But this approach is
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(1) (1981) (“A promise is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of trade.”); JOHN
CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY §§ 15–18 (2d
ed. 1895) (citing to thirteenth and fourteenth centuries hostility toward
restraints on alienation); George M. Cohen, The Financial Crisis and the
Forgotten Law of Contracts, 87 TUL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2012) (“Contract law has
long had a rule that contracts in restraint of trade are unenforceable because
they are inconsistent with the ideal of freedom of contract.”).
224
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 100, at 32; Steven N.S. Cheung,

Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual
Arrangements, 12 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1969); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain
Alienation?, 85 COLUMBIA L. REV. 970 (1985) [hereinafter Epstein, Why
Restrain Alienation?]; Winokur, supra note 105, at 25; Boyack, Community
Covenant Alienation Restraints, supra note 33.
225
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50. C.f. Epstein, Covenants and
Constitutions, supra note 80, at 922–25 (arguing that covenants should be
presumptively enforceable against buyers with constructive notice because
freedom of contract should be the lens through which to view a servitude
regime).
226
See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A

Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights in Existing
Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (1999) (“[E]conomic forces
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justified if, and only if, the “agreement” to CIC governance
really fits the traditional concept of a voluntary assent. If a
contact provision truly reflects party will and intent to be bound,
and if the obligation only lasts a “reasonable time,” and if it
imposes no unwarranted costs on third parties, then a freedom of
contract justification is quite compelling.227 But in reality, many
modern CC&Rs do not promote the autonomy and liberty values
behind freedom of contract.228 They are not really products of
party intent to be bound, they presumptively last in perpetuity,
and they impact personal freedoms of contract parties and nonparties. Because of this covenant-contract disconnect, freedom of
contract theory provides insufficient justification for the negative
externalities that certain types of CIC restrictions impose.

B. Limiting Servitude Scope
In addition to setting a higher assent threshold in the context
of CC&Rs, the law should revitalize the concept of a substantive
limit on CIC covenants beyond the outer limit of public policy.
Traditional servitude law provided this sort of limitation on
covenants scope: the touch and concern test.229 But years of
stretching this test to address all manner of restrictions has
. . . made private neighborhood associations the choice for millions of people
for their residential property.”); Laura T. Rahe, The Right to Exclude:
Preserving the Autonomy of the Homeowners’ Association, 34 URB. LAW.
521, 552 (2002) (“[T]he homeowners’ association” is properly viewed as “the
product of individual [consumer] choices.”).
227
See Kirby, supra note 223, at 429 (finding that courts “have not
adequately examined freedom of contract and its relationship to promissory
restraints” and concluding that “if two parties contract that a particular
property will not be subject to sale for some reasonable time” then such
agreement should be upheld).
228
See, e.g., Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest
Developments: Reflections on a Policy Role for the Judiciary , 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 421–22 (1998) (advocating for a higher threshold of
buyer consent, particularly with respect to covenants that impact an owner’s
basic rights).
229
See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.
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deprived it of any real meaning, and several modern scholars
have called for its abolition. Yet there remain compelling reasons
to have some sort of more restrictive substantive limit in the law
of real covenants beyond the public policy limitation of contract
law. Opting out is not an option in CICs. Breach does not
terminate obligation and a party cannot elect damages in lieu of
performance. Changing covenant terms is cumbersome at best
and impossible in some cases. Thus, there is a great need to have
some initial control of the legitimate subject matter for
regulations of private community covenants.
At the other end of the spectrum from those who call for
hands-off enforcement of all CIC covenants in the name of
freedom of contract are CIC naysayers who condemn this entire
system of property ownership and private governance. But calling
for elimination of condominiums, planned developments, and
association governance goes much too far. CIC governance
serves legitimate social functions. It provides a workable solution
to the tragedy of the commons, allowing shared neighborhood
amenities and common areas. It creates effective ways to combat
community nuisances caused by use incompatibilities.230 And it
can (perhaps only theoretically in some cases) foster engagement
and involvement at a local, grassroots level in community
problems, planning, and coalescence. In order to preserve the
Nuisance law is notoriously difficult to apply and necessitates ad hoc
decisions of reasonableness of a given use, leading to erratic results. Rose,
supra note 30, at 5. Prosser famously called the law of nuisance an
“impenetrable jungle.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 86 (5th ed. 1984). See also Boyack, Community
Covenant Alienation Restraints, supra note 33; Winokur, supra note 105, at
37. Prior to the advent of association governance, restrictive covenants would
only be enforced if an individual owner chose to sue for enforcement in court.
Such owner would bear the costs of this lawsuit, but all owners in the
community would benefit from having the covenant enforced. See MCKENZIE,
supra note 29, at 35; Marc A. Weiss & John W. Watts, Community Builders
230

and Community Associations: The Role of Real Estate Developers in Private
Residential Governance, in ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 98 (1989). This was yet
another manifestation of the freeriding problem and generally discouraged
legal enforcement of such ungoverned covenant regimes.
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effectiveness and value of these functions, CIC intrusion into
illegitimate spheres—such as those that impact important personal
freedoms or are not justified by neighbors’ economic interests—
should be disallowed.
The challenge comes in distinguishing justifiable realms of
community governance from unwarranted incursions of private
regulatory power. Because community servitudes can provide a
workable solution to neighborhood nuisances, limitations on
property use should be presumptively within the proper scope of
CIC covenants and association governance, particularly with
respect to uses that create cost externalities.
Other permissible areas of community governance relate to
the valuable CIC function of solving two economic failures of
common property: first, regulation of common areas to prevent
overuse, and second, requiring affirmative contribution to
common area upkeep to prevent freeriding. It is therefore
legitimate for CIC covenants to address the uses of both common
and individual property in the community. And CICs should also
be empowered to mandate pro rata owner assessment
contributions, take actions to collect these assessments, and
ensure the upkeep of common areas.231 Solving the “tragedy of
the commons”232 in terms of overuse and freeriding has been one
of the tremendous contributions that CICs have made.233 CICs
reap societal gains in encouraging community amenities,
providing for fair allocation of maintenance costs, and arbitrating
between use incompatibilities. Covenants addressing use, upkeep,
231

Most associations’ governing documents explicitly provide for
assessment funding of association obligations. See HYATT, supra note 4, at
105, 108. Where covenants do not so provide, courts have liberally implied the
power to collect assessments from owners who are benefitted by community
amenities and upkeep. See, e.g., Evergreen Highlands Ass’n v. West, 73 P.3d
1 (Colo. 2003).
232
Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45
(1968).
233
See TREESE ET AL., supra note 42, at 3–5 (noting that common upkeep
also allows a community to take advantage of cost savings from economies of
scale); Ellickson, supra note 49, at 1522–23 (discussing the equitable methods
of assessments and distribution of costs amongst property owners).
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and owner maintenance contribution should therefore be
considered justifiably within the substantive limits of servitude
law.
A modern conception of “touch and concern” could draw the
appropriate distinction, holding that how a property is used and
the requisite maintenance of that property—and requisite
contribution to common property—are aspects that are
substantively related to the real property itself.234
Other types of community covenants and rules, however, fall
beyond the permitted scope for governance by servitude.
Controlling who resides in a property, for example, is not the
same as controlling what the use of the property is.235 Occupancy
limitations, leasing prohibitions, and transfer restrictions are not
legitimate solutions to “commons” issues, but rather are
unjustifiable attempts by members of a community to control their
neighbors’ identity. Likewise, rules controlling behaviors that are
completely contained within a home are difficult to justify on the
basis of neighborhood externalities.236 Such covenants should be
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 770 (1986).
235
The use of the property turns on how it is enjoyed and employed by
234

the party in possession. For example, between a landlord and a tenant, it is the
tenant’s use that defines the use to which the property is being put. Several
courts have specifically held that renting a unit in a CIC (even short-term
rentals) does not render the “use” of that unit “commercial” rather than
residential. E.g., Kiekel v. Four Colonies Homes Ass’n, 162 P.3d 57 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2007); Lowden v. Bosley, 909 A.2d 261, 266 (Md. 2006); Kaufman
v. Fass, 756 N.Y.S.2d 247 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2003); Scott v. Walker, 645
S.E.2d 278 (Va. 2007). Leasing and occupancy restrictions are clearly
restraints on alienation of the right to possess, not a restriction on property
use. A residential occupant, no matter what her race and regardless of whether
she holds legal title or a leasehold interest, possesses and uses the property in
the same way as another residential occupant. To the extent leasing is a use, it
is but a use of the landlord’s investment capital. The actual use of the property
turns on how it is enjoyed and employed by the party in possession. This
concept is explained in greater depth in Boyack, Community Covenant
Alienation Restraints, supra note 33.
236
See Brower, supra note 20, at 204 (discussing the broad scope of CIC
governing provisions, including behavior inside homes). There are in-home
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limited by a modern substantive “touch and concern” requirement
in servitude law.
The best method to sort out which covenants are proper and
which are overreaching is to adopt a twenty-first century updated
“touch and concern” test. This test would require economic
justification for communal governance schemes rather than
focusing on the amorphous concept of relating to the land. If a
given covenant acts to remediate a cost externality—such as a
nuisance or an aspect of the “tragedy of the commons”—then
characterizing that provision as a servitude would be justified. An
agreement among neighbors that does not address a cost
externality, however, should not be elevated to the status of a real
covenant running with the land, regardless of the authors’ intent.
Rather, such neighborhood agreements that are not economically
justified should be mere personal contracts, analyzed and
enforced as such. Any non-covenant provisions of a
neighborhood agreement may (if they meet the formation
requirements of contract law) create in personam obligations
among the contracting parties. And the breach of these
obligations would give rise to a claim for contract damages. But
these terms would not run with the land nor would they be
specifically enforceable. This approach would preserve the value
of community covenants without allowing either the CIC
structure or the “touch and concern” limitations on covenantmaking to unduly encroach onto residents’ autonomy.

C. Solving the Constitutional Conundrum
Private regulation of certain personal freedoms generates
popular outrage.237 Courts have upheld association restrictions on
behaviors that may generate cost externalities. One example is smoking. See,
e.g., Ezra, supra note 151.
237
See DILGER, supra note 106, at 135–41; MCKENZIE, supra note 29;
Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 883 (1988); Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take A Village?
Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community , 47
VILL. L. REV. 553, 562 (2002); Laura Castro Trognitz, “Yes, It’s My
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free speech,238 but public opinion backlash has been substantial.
CIC restrictions on religious displays and practices have
generated critical scholarship.239 And rights of persons to privacy
and autonomy within their own homes have been fervently
defended.240 Although “constitutional” violations are often
asserted by discontented CIC members,241 absence of state action
is usually fatal to such claims.242 Constitutional jurisprudence with
respect to CICs is a bit of a mess—emotional outliers make for
bad law—and Supreme Court precedents can be misleading.243
This has led to disparate state law treatment of personal freedoms
in community covenant contexts.244 The tension in the law with
respect to constitutional freedoms and CIC functions needs to be
resolved.
Castle,” 30 A.B.A. J., June 2000, at 30; Tim Vanderpool, But Isn’t This My
Yard?,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Aug.
18,
1999),
http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0818/p2s2.html;

Brian

L.

Weakland,

Condominium Associations: Living Under the Due Process Shadow , 13 PEPP.
L. REV. 297, 299 (1986).
238
Midlake on Big Boulder Lake Condo. Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d
340, 350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that the owners “contractually agreed
to abide by the provisions in the Declaration at the time of purchase, thereby
relinquishing their freedom of speech concerns regarding placing signs on this
property”).
239
E.g., Angela C. Carmella, Religion-Free Environments in Common
Interest Communities, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 57 (2010); Amanda Hopkins, Note,

What’s Wrong with My Nativity Scene?: Religiously Discriminatory
Restrictive Covenants in New York, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 415 (2012).
See also supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
240
See, e.g., Arabian, supra note 133.
241
Hyatt, Common Interest Communities, supra note 67, at 338–39

(discussing the tendency to claim violation of constitutional rights in CIC
governance).
242
See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text; see also Lisa J.
Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments,
Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 233, 240 (2006).
243
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946).
244
See HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 2, at 114–55; Hyatt, Common
Interest Communities, supra note 67, 338–42.
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Proposed solutions to the CIC constitutional conundrum fall
into two general categories. One approach is to treat CIC
associations as if they were public government units, thereby
giving residents protection through the First Amendment and
other constitutional rights against community interference.245 This
approach is problematic and creates worrisome precedents, as
evidenced by the substantial judicial resistance to analogizing
private groups to public actors.246 The second, and preferable,
approach is a legislative solution—enact a “Bill of Rights” for
homeowners in CICs.
Professor Susan French was among the first to suggest a
homeowners’ bill of rights solution to the constitutional
governance gap in CICs.247 Professor French conceived of this
quasi-constitutional guaranty of personal freedoms as being a
provision included in the governing documents of the CIC.248
See, e.g., Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government, supra
note 106; Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions
on Free Speech? First Amendment Rights in Common Interest Communities ,
40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 739 (2006).
246
See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 516 (1976) (holding that
private property can only be treated as if it were public “when the property has
taken on all the attributes of a town” (emphasis in the original)); Illinois
Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978) (illustrating
how difficult it is to prove that private property has “all” aspects of a town);
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (explaining that state regulation
alone does not constitute state action); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179
(1988) (holding that regulatory power over an entity does not render acts of
that entity susceptible to Constitutional scrutiny); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (same). For discussions of the
limits of state action application to private communities, see G. Sidney
Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for
Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333 (1997); Katharine
Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State Constitutions to
Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1984).
247
See Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential
Government Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345,
350 (1992).
245

248

Id.
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More recently, groups have called for state legislatures to enact a
homeowners’ bill of rights that would apply to all CICs in the
state.249 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has considered including a bill of rights for
homeowners in CICs as part of its UCIOA revision.250 State
legislators could add great value by undertaking to identify and
guaranty important individual rights in the context of private CIC
governance. Statutory protection could solve the issue of to what
extent CIC governance can be analogized to public governance.
Creating special legislative protection for owners in CICs would
not only address the most emotionally charged topics of CIC
regulation (and siphon off the hard cases that make bad law) but
would also bring clarity to the contentious issue of constitutional
applicability to CIC governance.
CONCLUSION
Commentators and courts routinely consider the purchase of a
home in a CIC as a conscious, voluntary choice to be bound by
the applicable neighborhood covenants. Based on this assumption,
CIC covenants and rules promulgated thereunder are treated
presumptively enforceable, just like any other contract. The
realities of home-purchasing decisions and the CIC creation
process cast significant doubts on this approach. Although courts
claim that in enforcing CIC covenants they are upholding
neighborhood desires, in fact, the terms of community covenants
may not necessarily be expressions of community preference. The
original form of community covenants are imposed by developers
249

The AARP is promoting a Bill of Rights for Homeowners
Associations. The proposed Bill of Rights includes “the right to resolve
disputes without litigation,” the right to be informed of any changes to the
rules, and “the right to oversight of associations and directors.” For a
summary of the proposed bill, see A Bill of Rights for Homeowners in
Associations, IN BRIEF (AARP Pub. Policy Inst., Washington, D.C.), July
2006, at 1–2.
250
See Common Interest Ownership Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Common%20Interest%
20Ownership%20Act (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
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at the direction of municipalities and mortgage market actors, not
elected by the residents themselves. Furthermore, CIC restrictive
covenants are perpetual, mandatory, non-negotiable requirements
of owning a home in the community. And even if buyers actually
know, understand, and accept the content of recorded covenants
at the time of purchase, the content of neighborhood rules may
thereafter change in ways unforeseeable by a purchaser and
essentially unconstrained by courts or constitutions. Members
can opt out of this system of private regulation—but only by
selling their home.
The solution to the contract-covenant disconnect is to
recognize that recorded CC&Rs that impose neighborhood
obligations are not, in fact, simple contracts. CIC governance is
founded on and impacts three areas of the law: contracts,
property, and constitutional governance. The proper judicial
conception of CIC covenants and rulemakings, then, must draw
upon all three of these areas by requiring a bona fide
manifestation of assent to be bound, by appropriately limiting the
substantive scope of neighborhood covenants, and by protecting
homeowner rights from governmental overreaching.
First, a higher consent threshold is vital. In the context of
CIC covenants, the contractual temporal autonomy paradox is
augmented. Recorded declarations are non-negotiable contracts of
adhesion, and as such, it is unlikely that buyers—by the mere act
of purchase alone—have truly, voluntarily consented to the
obligations. A CIC homebuyer is not a “Ulysses,” deliberately
choosing to be bound in order to limit future action (for his own
benefit).251 Rather, a CIC homebuyer is bound without her
deliberate election and is subject to terms she has no hand in
crafting and no choice but to accept. Her supposed manifestation
of assent is the purchase of a home, and she cannot buy that
particular piece of property without acquiescing to the imposed
terms.
In other contexts, lack of buyer input with respect to adhesive
251

In THE ODYSSEY, Ulysses tied himself to the ship’s mast in order to
restrain himself from reacting to the sirens’ song. See Winokur, supra note
105, at 50 (explaining contractual obligation with reference to this metaphor).
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contract terms is rendered less objectionable because market
prices and market choices reflect general consumer preferences
and values among varying options.252 But in the context of CICs,
the lack of variation among CIC forms and the lack of non-CIC
housing choices in several parts of the country undermine these
market checks.253 In addition, a homebuyer usually comparisonshops with respect to the real property and not with respect to
associated covenant terms. Furthermore, CIC covenant terms
may not even be made available to or reviewed by a buyer until
closing (if at all). Providing a copy of CC&Rs only at closing
renders homebuyer “consent” specious. At residential home
closings, the homebuyer lacks both time and the benefit of
counsel to assist in navigating the often lengthy and complicated
CIC declaration, bylaws, and associated rules. Even when a
purchaser is aware of the content of the applicable CIC covenants
prior to closing, it is still pure fiction to claim that the owner
manifests her “choice” to be obligated thereunder when she
closes the home purchase. A homebuyer chooses the property and
merely acquiesces to associated covenants, most likely without
even knowing or understanding what these covenants require.
Combatting lack of true homeowner assent must be
supplemented by limitations on CIC covenant scope and
legislative protections of homeowner rights. These protections are
252

While limitations on autonomy may be value-detracting, most
theorists, courts and developers see a counterbalance in the ability of owners to
have input into controlling the autonomy of their neighbors in turn. In
addition, the CIC ownership structure permits shared amenity upkeep that
makes such amenities, and perhaps homeownership in general, more
affordable. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275,
1282 (1994) (“Notwithstanding the limitations on personal autonomy that are
inherent in the concept of shared ownership of residential property, common
interest developments have increased in popularity in recent years, in part
because they generally provide a more affordable alternative to ownership of a
single-family home.”).
253
See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1121 (“[I]t is difficult to
conceive of a more heavy-handed public interference in the private
marketplace than a government rule or practice that mandates a highly
particularized form of governance on new housing development.”).
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necessary because (a) the homeowners are not the authors of
community covenant content, and (b) the impact of overreaching
covenants extends far beyond the impact of overreaching terms in
contracts.
Unlike most contracts, governments and government-related
entities shape the content of CIC declarations to a far greater
degree than do preferences of the contracting parties—here the
neighborhood residents. To obtain zoning approval, developers
craft CC&Rs that address municipal priorities, such as creating
privately funded community amenities and upkeep.254 To create
communities that will qualify for FHA insurance and GSE
secondary market purchases, developers include provisions to
meet enumerated underwriting criteria, such as limitations on the
percentage of non-owner-occupants in a neighborhood.255 When
the CC&Rs are crafted and recorded, it is the desires of these
authorities that influence their content, not the theoretical and
unarticulated preferences of unidentified future buyers.256 This
fact alone argues for the implementation of some “bill of rights”
type of protection for the parties who are thus governed.
In addition, unlike typical contracts, CIC covenants
presumptively exist in perpetuity.257 The durability of covenants
makes it vital to reconsider subject matter limitations on CIC
governance and spheres of homeowner protection. Covenants
See id. at 1112 (asserting that “government policy aimed at loadshedding municipal functions and services onto newly created CICs” drives the
content of CC&Rs); see also Siegel, The Constitution and Private
Government, supra note 106 (claiming that governments dictate CIC formation
and content); supra notes 64, 72, 149, 151 and accompanying text (discussing
the concept of privatization of public function).
255
See supra notes 152–57 and accompanying text. The Restatement takes
the position that the only permissible leasing restrictions should be those
required by institutional lenders. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 6.7 cmt. b (2000).
256
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1113; Grassmick, supra note 2, at
212.
257
Although some early-generation CICs and CICs in Louisiana do have
expiration dates, most CIC covenants today continue indefinitely unless
terminated by supermajority (sometimes unanimous) vote. See supra note 126.
254
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should not be permitted to achieve in perpetuity every end that
would be achievable among original contracting parties. To run
with the land, a covenant should be justified by an economic
need—the problem of incompatible uses, negative externalities, or
free-riding, for instance. Only when covenant content supports
the legitimate function of CIC governance should the covenant be
enforceable as a servitude and not a mere personal contract.
Third, in addition to mandating a higher threshold for owner
consent and judicially limiting the scope of servitude provisions,
states should act to protect important owner and occupant rights
through legislation. Consent alone cannot protect future
generations of CIC owners from being bound by the value
judgments of today.258 For example, Professor Korngold
explained that even though proponents of perpetually enforceable
servitudes argue that dead hand control is rendered
unobjectionable by adequate notice,259 “this begs the question of
whether the deprivation of individual opportunity and autonomy
is itself ‘fair.’”260 For example, notice of a racial segregation
covenant would not justify its enforcement.261 Similarly, notice
that a covenant regime exists prior to purchase of a property in a
neighborhood should not necessarily justify the enforcement of
private regulations that impinge on individual rights or are
258

Dead hand control is perhaps the “most compelling reason” that courts
should be wary of treating freedom of contract as dispositive in determining
servitude enforceability. Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes,
supra note 27, at 457.
259
Susan F. French, Toward A Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving
the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1282 (1982).
260
Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27, at
457. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (2000)
(noting that duration of the restraint is an important consideration); Federico
Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and A Troubled Future , 73 DENV.
U. L. REV. 1077, 1098 (1996) (“Generally, courts’ willingness to accept
restrictions that limit alienability has been inversely proportional to the
duration of the restriction.”).
261
Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27, at
457.
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unjustifiable based on economic exigency. Notice is not
synonymous with choice.
Subject matter constraint is also warranted because servitudes
are specifically enforceable; an owner cannot choose to pay
expectation damages rather than comply.262 A breach, even
numerous breaches, of an obligation does not terminate the
restriction. And although a supermajority of owners can amend or
perhaps even terminate CIC restrictions, these options are
cumbersome and practically difficult to achieve.263 When it comes
to CIC obligations, opting out of particular covenants is not a
possibility and neither is exit by breach. The only way to escape
obligations imposed by a CIC regime is to transfer ownership or
mobilize a sufficient number of community members to vote for
covenant revisions.264 Some CICs require near unanimity to
change or eliminate the governance regime, and this poses a
collective action problem that grows with the size of the subject
community.265
There is a clear disconnect between freedom of contract ideals
and the realities of CIC covenant formation. Reflexive
enforcement of CIC governing provisions based on contract
principles perpetuates the myth of knowing consent by owners to
262
263

See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text.
See Winokur, supra note 105, at 35–37 (explaining the practical

difficulties involved in amending CIC covenants). Several state enabling
statutes provide that a CIC can only be dissolved through unanimous vote of
the members. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-556 (Supp. 1964); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 19 (Supp. 1964).
264
CICs are plagued with participation problems that transcend even
issues of lack of participation in democracies generally. See generally David
C. Drewes, Note, Putting the “Community” Back in Common Interest
Communities: A Proposal for Participation-Enhancing Procedural Review, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 314, 315 (2001); Ross Thomas, Note, Ungating Suburbia:
Property Rights, Political Participation, and Common Interest Communities ,
22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205 (2012).
265
See Steven A. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy
and the End of Corporate Governance Law , 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 345, 383–84
(2007) (concluding that the collective action problem increases with group
size); Sterk, supra note 10, at 617 (explaining the problem of holdouts and
collective action costs in the context of CIC amendment).
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be bound to these provisions. The reality of CIC covenant
creation suggests that courts and legislatures should take a more
proactive approach to protect owners from covenant overreaching
and balancing competing public policies. True manifestation of
knowing assent to CIC governance—covenant terms and
governing processes—should be prerequisite to buying into a
community. And the law should impose subject matter limitations
on the scope of CIC governance, both through limiting what
obligations can become servitudes and by legislatively protecting
important individual rights.

